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THE LAWYER AS CONSENSUS BUILDER: ETHICS
FOR A NEW PRACTICE
CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW·

What ... promotes or impedes good work today? ... [Glood work-work
of expert quality that benefits the broader society ... ,
HOWARD GARDNER ET AL., GOOD WORK: WHEN EXCEllENCE AND ETHICS MEET, at
xi (2001).

Cooperation-the basis of our earliest hunting successes, the force behind
our evolving capacity for language, the glue of our social cohesion. . . .
Selfishness is also written on our hearts. This is our mammalian conflict:
what to give to the others and what to keep for yourself. Treading that line,
keeping the others in check and being kept in check by them, is what we call
morality.
IAN MCEWAN, ENDURING LOVE i 5 (i 997). I

I. INTRODUCTION: ETHICS AND CONVENTIONAL CONCEPTIONS OF THE
LA WYER' S ROLE

The traditional role ofa lawyer is to represent a client's partisan interest.
The first few iterations of ethical rules for lawyers mainly recognized the
lawyer's role as a representative in a litigation setting. 2 More recently,
• Professor of Law and Director, Georgetown-Hewlett Program on Conflict Resolution
and Legal Problem Solving, Georgetown University Law Center. This article draws on several
presentations made while visiting The University of Tennessee as Distinguished Visiting
Professor in Advocacy and Dispute Resolution in March 2002. I would like to thank The
University of Tennessee faculty for its hospitality, and I would like to give a special thanks to
myoid friend and colleague Dean Rivkin for stimulating conversations on this and other topics.
1. The first chapter of this novel recounts the attempted rescue by several individuals of
two passengers in a falling hot air balloon. The rescuers' decisions to hold on or let go of the
hot air baUoon demonstrate the tensions of the "prisoner's dilemma," which involve deciding
whether to cooperate or defect in the absence of any communication among the parties. See
AV1NASHDIXIT & SUSAN SKEATH, GAMES OF STRATEGY 225-87 (1999); WILUAMPOUNDSTONE,
PRISONER'S DILEMMA 216 (1992) (stating that in the prisoner's dilemma, "the common good
is subverted by individual rationality," where "[elach player desires the other's cooperation, yet
is tempted to defect himself').
2. In 1908, the American Bar Association ("ABA"), at the time an exclusive professional
association, adopted the original Canons of Professional Ethics ("Canons"). MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT preface, at vii (2002). The Canons were based on the pioneering work of
Judge George Sharswood, whose work was published in 1854, and David Hoffinan, whose work
was published in 1836 as originally codified in the Code of Ethics "adopted by the Alabama Bar
Association in 1887." [d. Between 1913 and 1964, a number of ABA cornriUttees were charged
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ethical codes for lawyers have recognized alternative roles that lawyers
conduct issues, and dealing with grievances. Id. In 1964, ABA President Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
created a special committee to assess the ethical standards of the profession. /d. The
committee's work resulted in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code"),
which was adopted by the ABA in 1969 and then adopted by a "majority of state and federal
jurisdictions." Id. In 1977, the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards entirely
revamped the Model Code into its current form-the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
("Model Rules"). Id. at vii-viii. The Model Rules omitted the three levels of canons,
disciplinary rules, and ethical considerations and included only simplified blackletter rules and
comments, which merely explained the Model Rules and advised readers of other substantive
laws or principles that might affect the professional conduct oflawyers. Robert W. Meserve,
Introduction, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT at xi (2002).
For many years, about half of the states operated under the Model Code and the other half
operated under the Model Rules. California, however, has yet to adopt the Model Rules or the
Model Code; instead, it has drafted its own regulations, which are found in the California
Business and Professions Code and the California Rules of Professional Conduct. In 1997, the
ABA established the Ethics 2000 Commission, to address a variety of important and new issues,
such as modem communication technologies, class action law suits, and ADR. Id. preface, at
viii. The Ethics 2000 Commission, however, only submitted proposals for relatively minor
amendments to the Model Rules and, for the most part, avoided dealing with such questions
concerning multi-disciplinary practice, class actions, ADR, and many modem technological
issues. Where the Ethics 2000 Commission took a relatively bold stand (following the
American Law Institute's similar treatment in section 67 of the Restatement (Third) ofthe Law
Governing Lawyers), in proposing to permit lawyers to disclose confidential client information
to "prevent, mitigate or rectify" serious economic injury, see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (Proposed Official Draft 2002), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-ruleI6.html(last visited Oct. 3.1, 2002), the ABA House of
Delegates rejected the Ethics 2000 Commission's proposal when it approved the amendments
to the Model Rules in February 2002. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002),
available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-ruleI6.html(last visited Oct. 31, 2002); ABA
Center for Professional Responsibility, Ethics 2000 Comm'n, at http://www.abanet.
orglcpr/e2k-report _home.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2002).
The Ethics 2000 Commission's treatment of disclosure of economic fraud is further
complicated by the recent passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
§ 307, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of II V.S.C.A., 18 V.S.C.A., 28
V.S.C.A., and 29 V.S.C.A.), which requires lawyers to report corporate fraud to corporate
officials, board members, and others. Id. at 784. The states and the Securities and Exchange
Commission will now regulate disclosure ofeconomic fraud, and thus, federal and state law may
differ from the ABA's official position in the Model Rules. It is important to remember that the
Model Rules do not have the force of positive law unless enacted by a state's legislature or
supreme court, which has regulatory power over that state's legal profession. However, the
Model Rules and the advisory opinions issued by the ABA Standing Committee on Professional
Responsibility, although not law, are widely influential because most states have formally
adopted most of the Model Rules with a series of variations. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 67 reporter's note (2000) (reviewing state departures from the
Model Rules). It remains to be seen whether the formulations and blackletter rules of the
Restatement (Third) ofthe Law Governing Lawyers will displace the Model Rules as states now
begin another round of review of ethics rules and regulations.
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perfonn as counselors,3 lobbyists,4 and government lawyers. s Such
recognition of alternative roles, however, assumes that lawyers will continue
to serve as zealous advocates for their clients. In general, a lawyer's duty is
conceived of as a duty to maximize a client's individual, corporate, or entity
interest within the bounds of the law. 6 Thus, although there are some limits
placed on the "zealous advocate,"7 the lawyer's goal is to seek gains that
benefit his client-whether those gains are achieved by "winning" in litigation
or by drafting advantageous clauses in contracts.
In the last few decades, the American Bar Association ("ABA") has
revised the ethical rules for lawyers several times, beginning with the Model
Code ofProfessional Responsibility ("Model Code") in 1969, continuing with
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") in 1983,8 and, most
recently, with the proposed revisions to the Model Rules by the Ethics 2000
Commission. 9 With each revision, debates emerge regarding the introduction
of new duties and responsibilities for lawyers who serve in alternative roles
of legal practice. 1O Despite the ABA's efforts, arguments continue regarding
whether it is possible to draft an ethical code for a unitary legal profession and
whether specialized codes are required to recognize the distinct duties that

3. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1,2.3-2.4 (2002) (stating that a
lawyer may advise a client on "moral, economic, social[,] and political" considerations, provide
a third party with "an evaluation of a matter affecting a client" if "compatible with ... the
lawyer's relationship with the client[,]" and serve as a third-party neutral for "two or more
persons who are not" the lawyer's clients).
4. See, e.g., id. R. 3.9 (discussing the procedures a lawyer must follow when
"representing a client before a legislative body or administrative agency in a nonajudicative
proceeding").
5. See, e.g., id. R. 3.8 (discussing the particular ethical responsibilities of prosecutors
in criminal cases).
6. See WILUAMSIMON, lHEPRACTICEOFJUSTICE: A lHEORY OF LAWYER'S ETHICS 7-8
(1998).
7. Compare MODEL CODE OFPROF'LREsPONSffiIUTY Canon 7 (1980) (including zealous
representation in the black letter rule), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'LCONDUCT pmbl., 8 & R.
1.3 cmt. [I] (2002) (discussing zealous advocacy only in the preamble and in comment
sections). Despite such textual revisions, most lawyers continue to claim that their duty is to
zealously protect and advocate for their clients. Thus, the culture of ethics may not entirely
coincide with the letter of the law or the rules.
8. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT preface, at vii-viii (2002).
9. To view the full text of the Model Rules, as approved by the House of Delegates in
February 2002, and the Model Rules, as proposed by the Ethics 2000 Commission, see ABA
Center for Professional Responsibility, Ethics 2000 Comm'n, at http://www.abanet.
orglcpr/e2k-report _ home.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2002).
10. Despite drafting rules that recognize lawyers as third-party neutrals, the Ethics 2000
Commission considered, yet declined, to draft ethical rules for lawyers representing clients in
class action lawsuits. See Nancy Moore, Who Should Regulate Class Action Lawyers?, U. IlL
L. REv. (forthcoming 2003). Bankruptcy lawyers also unsuccessfully lobbied for special ethical
rules for their specialized practice.
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flow from alternative fonns of legal practice. II
Increasingly, private
professional associations, federal agencies,12 state agencies, and other bodies
have begun to regulate lawyer conduct.
In this Article, I explore the roles of lawyers in alternative dispute
resolution C"ADR"), including traditional roles in arbitration and "new" roles
in mediation and facilitation. I also discuss how conventional ethics rules for
lawyers fail to provide guidance and "best practices" for lawyers who serve
in these new roles. State legislatures and professional associations, such as
the American Arbitration Association C"AAA"), the Center for Public
Resources Institute for Dispute Resolution ("CPR"), and the Association of
Conflict Resolution, have adopted ethical codes for mediators and arbitrators.
Select professional associations are also developing "best practice" guides for
the provision of ADR services; however, the lack of clarity in the Model
Rules is a serious problem. The failure of the Model Rules to recognize the
role oflawyers in "peacemaking," dispute prevention or resolution, and legal
problem solving marks an absence in what is publicly recognized as among
thernost important roles a lawyer performs-that ofa "constructive lawyer."13
Furthennore, the Model Rules misrepresent the legal profession by assuming
that representing clients in adversarial matters is the only role lawyers fulfill. 14

II. See. e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements ofMass Torts: When
the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CoRNELLL. REv. 1159, 1161 (1995) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow,
Ethics and the Settlement ofMass Torts J("We probably need to recraft some of our ethics rules
(conflicts of interests, attorney-client relations, and attorneys' fees) to take account of new forms
of action and representation. ").
12. Congress recently passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §
307, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of II U.S.C.A., 18 U.S.C.A., 28
U.S.C.A., and 29 U.S.C.A.), which requires lawyers to "whistle blow" or disclose "evidence of
a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the"
corporation "to the chief legal counselor chief executive officer" and to certain board
committees if the counselor officer does not appropriately respond. [d. 116 Stat. at 784; see
also Stephanie Francis Cahill, Corporate-Fraud Law Forces Lawyers to be Whistle-Blowers,
I A.B.A. J. EREp., Aug. 2, 2002, at, I, available at WL 29 ABAJEREP I [hereinafter Cahill,
Corporate Fraud Law] (''The corporate responsibility law ... requires in-house and outside
lawyers to report evidence of corporate wrongdoing to their client companies' boards of
directors. "). Such a rule is contrary to the dictates oflawyer-client confidentiality in the Model
Rules. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002). The original Ethics 2000
Commission proposal to require lawyers to report economic fraud was defeated in the House
of Delegates in February 2002. See Stephanie Francis Cahill, Task Force Has Take On
Lawyers' Responsibility, I A.B.A. J. EREp., Aug. 2, 2002, at" 4, 7, available at WL 29
ABAJEREP2.
13. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral:
Creativity and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L. REv. 785, 786 (1999) (quoting
Professor Vicki Jackson, Remarks at the Meeting of CPR Comm'n on Problem-Solving in Legal
Educ., at Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. (Oct. 22, 1999» [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, The
Lawyer as Problem Solver).
14. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodem.
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Such an assumption fails to give adequate guidance to a lawyer who fulfills
a broader, and perhaps, more significant role than that of a "hired gun."ts
As we debate the basic elements of human nature-whether humans are
intrinsically competitive or cooperative l6-sirnilar debates also arise regarding
the legal profession. Do lawyers engage in unnecessary adversarial conflicts
or, in the alternative, do lawyers contribute to society by negotiating
agreements, 17 creating new entities and concepts,18 seeking justice, resolving
disputes, and facilitating policy initiatives?19 If lawyers are capable of
performing new roles, what incentives, rules, and regulations should govern
their behavior?

n.

NEW ROLES FOR LA WYERS: DISPUTE RESOLVERS, THIRD-PARTY
NEUTRALS, AND FACILITATORS

In his novel Enduring Love, Ian McEwan eloquently expresses the
dilemma ofcooperation versus selfishness. 2o The protagonist, a science writer
named Joe Rose, is picnicking in a field when he sees a hot air baBoon with
a passenger dangling from a rope. 21 Sensing his "cooperative," lifepreserving, and altruistic instincts, Rose rushes into the field to try to help the
passenger.22 Four other men respond similarly and run from each comer of
the field.23 The men manage to grab the lines, but the wind catches the
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 5,24 (1996) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, The
Trouble with the Advocacy System).
15. See ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, Enncs FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORAUTY OF ROLES
IN PUBUC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE 108 (1999) (analyzing the profession of law and the

adversarial role oflawyers as a core animating principle).
16. See, e.g., ROBERT AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION preface, at ix-x
(1984); RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 12 (1976); MATT RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF
VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERAnON 6-7 (1996) ("Society ...
evolved as part of our nature. . .. [W]e must look inside our brains at the instinct for creating
and exploiting social bonds .... We must also look at other animals to see how the essentially
competitive business of evolution can sometimes give rise to cooperative instincts. "). See
generally ELLIOTT SOBER & DAVID SLOAN WILSON, UNTO OTHERS: THE EVOLUTION AND
PSYCHOLOGY OF UNSELFISH BEHAVIOR (1998) (exploring sources of altruism and the effects of
altruism as a motivational force).
17. See ROBERT H. MNOOKINET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VAWE
IN DEALS AND DISPUTES, at ix (2000); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword:
Business Lawyers and Value Creationfor Clients, 74 OR. L. REv. 1,7-8 (1995).
18. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving
and Teachable in Legal Education?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 97, 124-25 (2001).
19. See CARRIE MENKEL-MEAOOW, 1HE LAWYERS' ROLE(S) IN DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY 16·23 (2000) (unpUblished manuscript, on
with the Tennessee Law Review).
20. See McEWAN, supra introductory quote.
21. Id. at 9.
22. Id. at 10.
23. Id.

file

HeinOnline -- 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 67 2002-2003

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

68

[Vol. 70:63

balloon and pushes it Up.24 As they coast upward, the roar of the wind
prevents the men from communicating with each other about what to do
next. 2S This is the "prisoner's dilemma," but the situation the characters face
is not a game. Several lives hang in the balance, and each rescuer must decide
whether to hold on or let go as the balloon veers toward an escarpment, which
drops off a considerable distance, making a safe, controlled landing less
possible. 26 With the force of nature and chance (the wind), combined with
unorganized human behavior, itself derived from conflicting motives of
altruistic rescue and self-interested survival, what can be done? It is not clear
who "defects" first; however, all but one of the five rescuers drop the line so
as to land safely before the balloon is carried over the cliff and tragedy
ensues. 27 In the aftermath, the protagonist Rose considers a variety of
important philosophical questions about the nature of man and his efforts to
coordinate human activity. Rose concludes that
[t]here may have been a vague commonality of purpose, but we were never
a team. . . . Any leader, any firm plan, would have been preferable to none.
No human society, from the hunter-gatherer to the post-industrial, has come
to the attention of anthropologists that did not have its leaders and the led;
and no emergency was ever dealt with effectively by democratic process ..
.. What is certain is that if we had not broken ranks, our collective weight
would have brought the balloon to earth a quarter of the way down the slope
as the gust subsided a few seconds later. . .. [T]here was no team, there was
no plan, no agreement to be broken. 28

Rose contemplates the nature of man and finds it in need of coordination in
order to be a good society-"one that makes sense of being good.,,29
Much like the participants in a prisoner's dilemma situation, parties
involved in real human conflicts cannot reach an outcome favorable to all
without communication and coordination; though some outcome will result
in the absence of communication (as in the Enduring Love example), that
outcome may ignore, disregard, or contravene the interests of one or more of
the parties. 30 A facilitator is required to coordinate activities and to facilitate

24.

Id.
Id.
26. Id. at 14.
27. Id.atI4-17.
28. Id. at 11,14-15.
29. Id. at 15.
30. Most game theory assumes that no coordination occurs and assumes that individuals
seek "solutions" in strategies that make assumptions about how the others will also attempt to
maximize their gains. John Nash's Nobel Prize-winning work, based on his "Nash equilibrium"
solution, explained how actors should behave in multi-party, simultaneous action, and in noncooperative games. See DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note I, at 82, 213-16 (stating that application
in real life suggests that actors seek some "pay-offs" in reciprocity and reputation in repeated
25.
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problem solving and communication, especially in emergency settings. 31
A modem philosopher has recently reached similar conclusions after a
lifetime of studying the elements of a good society. In his recent book, Justice
is Conjlict,32 Stuart Hampshire suggests that humans are unlikely to agree on
the elements of the "good life" and are more likely to hold conflicting values
due to the increasingly diverse world; therefore, we may only reach a
consensus regarding fair procedures for resolving disagreements. 33 Aud~
alteram partem, which means to "hear the other side,"34 is the one principle
that may unite us. We, as lawyers, must learn to hear ourselves as well as
others and to reason in a balanced manner as the adversarial system requires.
Procedures can create justice and fairness, and the procedures of conflict
resolution are our only hope for survival in a world where we are unlikely to
agree on our ultimate aims. Hampshire suggests that "the skillful management
of conflict [is] among the highest of human skills.,,3s Although Hampshire
rests his procedural justice claim on a conventional view of adversarial
justice, citing such familiar examples as trials, arbitration, and negotiation, he
argues t..'1at developing institutions that promote procedural fairness should be
the first priority of lawyers, especially where "the human race is unlikely to
survive for very long unless reasonably fair procedures develop and become
accepted for negotiations and arbitrations in the settling of international
conflicts threatening war. ,,36
For at least two decades, creating institutions and procedures that are
capable of providing fair processes, where all sides may be heard, has been the
goal ofpolitical scientists, public-policy practitioners, and conflict-resolution
theorists and practitioners at both the international and domestic levels. 37

games so that "fair and nice" behavior can be a Nash equilibrium in a repeated game); see also
AxELROD, supra note 17, at 118-20 ("[I]t is good advice to ... reciprocate defection as well as
cooperation."). The movie, A BEAUTIFUL MIND (DreamWorks Pictures 2001), provides a
simplified illustration of how individuals maximize joint and individual gain by declining to
seek the same scarce resource, a single blonde, and choosing instead the next best resource, a
group of brunettes. [d. For a historical description of John Nash and his work, see SYLVIA
NASAR, A BEAUTIFUL MIND (1998).
3 \. See GARY KLEIN, SOURCES OF POWER: How PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS 222-23 (1999)
(describing the importance of communicating intent to team members to facilitate independence,
problem solving, and coordination of activities).
32. STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT (2000).
33. [d. at 79.
34. [d. at 8-11.
35. [d. at 35.
36. [d. at 40.
37. See, e.g., JACOB BERCOVITCH & JEFFREY Z. RUBIN, MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 13 (1992) (stating that "international, transnational, and other non-state actors ..
.. [are] very active participants in the search for institutions and proposals conducive to peace,"
and that it is expected that "such organizations [will] play their full part in the mediation of
international disputes"); ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
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Building on the work of social philosopher Jiirgen Habennas, who argued for
"ideal speech conditions,,38 where democratic discourse may be employed to
resolve conflict, American theorists and practitioners have elaborated on the
practice of "deliberative democracy,,39 and "democratic discourse.,,40 The
goal of deliberative democracy and democratic discourse is to allow for
greater participation by individuals most affected by policy issues or conflict
resolution. In the words ofHabennas, a "moral norm is valid only insofar as
it wins assent of the people concerned. ,,41

WITHOUT GIVING IN 40 (2d ed. 1991) ("The basic problem in a negotiation lies not in
conflicting positions, but in the conflict between each side's needs, desires, concerns, and
fears. "); JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, BUilDING PEACE: SUSTAINABLE RECONCIUATION IN DNIDED
SOCIETIES 24 (J 997) (''To be at all germane to contemporary conflict, peacebuilding must be
rooted in and responsive to the experimental and subjective realities shaping people's
perspectives and needs."); DEAN G. PRUITT & JEFFREY Z. RUBIN, SOCIAL CONFLICT:
ESCALATION, STALEMATE, AND SETTLEMENT 140 (1986) ("It is often possible to engage in
problem solving and at the same time cope directly with these risks [such as one party
benefitting more from problem solving] by ... communicating covertly with the other party,
combining problem solving with contentious behavior, equalizing the parties in verbal ability,
or paying greater attention to the needs of the party with greater threat capacity ...."). See
generally MARC HOWARD Ross, lHE CULTUREOFCONFUCT: INTERPRETATIONS AND INTERESTS
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1993) (exploring conflict management in intergroup and crosscultural relations); HAROLD SAUNDERS, A PUBUC PEACE PROCESS: SUSTAINED DIALOGUE TO
TRANSFORM RACIAL AND ETHNIC CONFLlCTS (1999) (describing a process by which disputants
in significant international and domestic ethnic conflicts can move toward more peaceful
relations through "sustained dialogues").
38. See JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE lHEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 22 (William Rehg trans., 1996); JORGEN
HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 3-15, 116-23 (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1979); I JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION:
REASON AND THE RATIONAUZATION OF SOCIETY 30?-07 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984).
39. See JAMES BOHMAN, PUBllC DELIBERATION: PLURAllSM, COMPLEXITY, AND
DEMOCRACY 1-3 (1996); JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DEliBERATION: NEWDlRECTIONS
FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM 35-37 (1991). Seegenera/ly AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON,
DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT ( 1996) (exploring compromise in a system of representative
government); DELIBERATIVE POUTICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (Stephen
Macedo ed., 1999) (questioning in a series of essays the conventional wisdom of deliberative
democracy).
40. See generally MARK KINGWELL, A ClVlL TONGUE: JUSTICE, DIALOGUE, AND THE
POUTICS OF PLURALISM (1995) (discussing justice and communicative action); cf FREDERICK
SCHAUER, TALKING AS DECISION PROCEDURE, lHE GoOD SOCIETY (1999) (criticizing
deliberative democracy literature as focused on "process" cures, rather than on substantive value
conflicts).
41. CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF DEliBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 110
(1996); see also JORGEN HABERMAS, Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program ofPhilosophical
Justification, in MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 43-115 (Christian
Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholson trans., 1990).
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Application of modem political and conflict resolution theories42 to legal
and policy disputes encouraged the redevelopment and reorientation of
conventional ADR procedures, such as mediation and arbitration,43 and
prompted the development of new forms of ADR, such as "consensus
building"44 and participatory pUblic-policy fora. 4s Whether they are
attempting to resolve traditional legal disputes through facilitated negotiation
(mediation), private adjudication (arbitration), or as facilitors of public policy
fora, lawyers use their legallmowledge and expertise and act as neutrals, not
as partisan representatives, as contemplated by the Model Rules. When the
purpose of the lawyer's work is to facilitate an agreement that is acceptable
to all parties rather than to attempt to maximize the individual client's interest,
conventional lawyer ethics rules have scant relevance.
Lawyers who serve in neutral roles share responsibilities with nonlawyers who are professionals and non-professionals. 46 While some worry
that rigorous ethical rules, which only apply to lawyers who serve in neutral
roles, will place lawyers at a disadvantage, I argue that higher standards wiIl

42. See, e.g., MORTON DEUTSCH, THE HANDBOOK OF CONFUCT RESOLUTION: THEORY
AND PRACTICE (Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds., 2000) (exploring developing theories
in social and cognitive psychology and sociology for application to conflict resolution practice);
MORTON DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT: CONSTRUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE
PROCESSES 151 (I 973)(stating that
[t]here are two basic modes of intrapsychic conflict resolution. First is the tendency to
change the external reality so that the conflict between the behavioral tendencies no longer
exists; the other is to change the cognitions and/or valences that determine the direction
and potency of the conflicting behavioral tendencies).
43. For my argument that recent conflict-resolution theory and practice in law and legal
studies originated with the work of the Legal Process school of the 1950s, most notably the
work of Lon Fuller, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The
Intellectual Founders ofADR, 16 OHIO ST. 1. ON DISP. RESOL. I (2000). See also Lon L. Fuller,
Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 305 (1971) (discussing the theory and
methodology of mediation).
44. See generally THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
REACHING AGREEMENT (Lawrence Susskind et aJ. eds., 1999) (discussing the process,
application, and success of consensus building).
45. See, e.g., SUSAN CARPENTER & W.J.D. KENNEDY, MANAGING PUBUC DISPUTES
(2001).
46. Very few states regulate the provision of intermediation services. Thus, virtually
anyone may claim to be a mediator or facilitator. Some states, like Florida, regulate the
conditions under which someone may mediate in a court program. See, e.g., FLA. R. elY. P.
10.1 00(b)(2) (West 2000) (stating that, among other requirements, a family mediator must
have a master's degree or doctorate in social work, mental health, or behavioral or social
sciences; be a physician certified to practice adult or child psychiatry; or be an attorney
or a certified public accountant licensed to practice in any United States jurisdiction; and
.have at least 4 years practical experience in one of the aforementioned fields or have 8
years family mediation experience with a minimum of 10 mediations per year).
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make lawyers more appealing. 47 Alexis de Tocqueville was among the first
to note that, at least in the United States, lawyers might be particularly wellsuited to participate in the intennediation of class, policy, and partisan
interests because, in a democratic society that does not have an aristocracy or
monarchy, "[lawyers] serve as arbiters between the citizens."48
Why might lawyers be particularly well-suited to serve as the citizens'
arbiters or dispute resolvers? What may lawyers do to resolve social,
economic, and political problems beyond fonnal adversarial client
representation? Elsewhere, I defined a lawyer as
a professional with fonnallegal training who employs law, as well as other
relevant disciplines [and skills], to solve human problems and disputes, plan
transactions, prepare legal instruments and regulations, and who facilitates
and engages in processes designed to accomplish compliance with law and
the pursuit of justice as members of society seek to accomplish legitimate
aims of individual and sociallife. 49
Anthony Kronrnan suggests that lawyers have a special place in the
intermediation of private interests, public values, and institutions because of
their dual loyalty to clients and to the polity in which they serve as officers of
justice, if not narrowly, the courts. Kronman says that
[l]awyers serve private interests of their clients but they also care about
integrity and justice of the legal system that defmes public order within
which these interests are pursued. In this way, they provide a link between
the realms of public and private life, helping to rejoin what the forces of
privatization are constantly pulling apart. so
Lawyers, then, may serve as mediators of the social order, helping to achieve
the bargained for, principled,S I and creative S2 arrangements that cultivate

47. Consider how fickle the public is about trusting professions. After many years of
documented distrust of lawyers, see Michael Asimow, Embodiment ofEvil: Law Firms in the
Movies, 48 UCLA L. REv. 1339, 1372 (2001) ("Recent Harris Polls have found that public
attitudes to lawyers and law firms, which were already low, continue to get worse. Lawyers
have seen a dramatic decline in their 'prestige' which has fallen faster than that of any other
occupation, over the last twenty years." (quoting The Harris Poll # 37 (Aug. II, 1997))),
lawyers are now seen as possible saviors of the public in litigation against auditors and
corporate executives in the wake of recent corporate audit scandals.
48. ALExIs DE TOCQUEVll.LE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 243 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner
eds., George Lawrence trans., 1966).
49. Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as a Problem Solver, supra note 13, at 793-94
(emphasis omitted).
50. Anthony Kronman, The Law as a ProfeSSion, in Enncs IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS'
ROLES, RESPONSlBIUTIES, AND REGULATION 29,36 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000).
51. See Jon Elster, Strategic Use ofArgument, in BARRIERS TO CONFUCT RESOLUTION
239 (Kenneth 1. Arrow et al. eds., 1995) (giving an elegant description and contrast of
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peaceful co-existence, social hannony, social justice, and Pareto-optimality. 53
Modem legal disputes, in both the public and private realm, often involve
multiple parties and issues and take many different fonns. Beyond the
traditional civil or criminal trials, contemporary legal disputes include ADR
procedures, such as private mediation, arbitration, hybrids of mediation and
arbitration, such as mediation-arbitration ("med-arb") and mini-trials,54 and
court-recommended procedures, such as settlement conferences, arbitration,
mediation, and summary jury and judge trials. In addition to these better
known examples of "alternative" (we now say "appropriate") dispute
resolution, newer forms of ADR, such as facilitated policy dialogue,
consensus building, and multi-track negotiation and diplomacy are gaining
popularity in the resolution of lawsuits, public policy issues, budget and
resource allocation, and environmental, local community, and international
disputes. In all of these processes, a "neutral," rather than a partisan, guides
the process by serving as a mediator or conciliator in facilitating negotiation
between the parties, as an arbitrator in deciding legal or factual issues for the
parties, or as a facilitator in "help[ing] a group of individuals or parties with
divergent views reach a goal or complete a task to the mutual satisfaction of
the participants. "55 Legal training provides special expertise and opportunities
for these functions to be performed by a law-trained person; however, legal
education does not necessarily train lawyers for alternative roles,56 and
conventional ethics rules do not provide guidance for good practices.
To the extent that third-party interveners derive their power and authority
from "their status, legitimacy, process-management skills, and
persuasiveness,,,5'lawyers may be especially suited to perform a wide range
ofthird-party neutral roles, particularly when legal issues arise. In its simplest

bargaining and reasoning in the political processes that lead to political agreements, even in
such important matters as constitution-making).
52. See Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible?, supra note 18.
53. See HOWARDRAlFFA, THE ART ANDSCIENCEOFNEGOTlATION 139 (1982)(discussing
Pareto-optimality-the condition where parties can no longer improve their individual positions
without causing harm to the other parties).
54. See The ABC's ofADR: A Dispute Resolution Glossary, 13 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
COST LITIG. 14 (1995).
55. DICTIONARY OFCONFUCT RESOLUTION 177 (Douglas H. Yam ed., 1999) (defining
"facilitator").
56. See. e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Problem-Solving Pedagogy Seriously: A
Response to the Attorney General, 49 J. LEGAL Eouc. 14 (1999) (discussing the process in
which law schools may educate law students in problem-solving techniques); Janet Reno,
Lawyers as Problem-Solvers: Keynote Address to the AALS, 49 J. LEGAL Eouc. 5, 5-6 (1999)
(urging law schools to incorporate "problem solving" into the core curriculum of legal
education).
57. MICHAEL WATKINS, BREAKTHROUGH BUSINESS NEGOTIATION: A TOOLBOX FOR
MANAGERS, ch. 7 (2002), reprinted in Michael Watkins, Third Party Dilemmas: Are the
Neutrals Workingfor Themselves? 20 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 199 (2002).
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fonn, a lawyer serving as a third-party neutral acts as a mediator between two
or more disputing parties by facilitating negotiations without deciding
anything for the parties. 58 Mediators do not represent the parties who appear
before them. For that reason, among others, Rule 2.2 of the old version of the
Model Rules, which permitted a lawyer to serve as an "intennediary" and
engage in joint representation of clients, has been dropped from the revised
version of the Model Rules. 59 Because lawyers who serve as mediators do not
represent parties, the conventional ethical rules, which depend on the
representational relationship, cannot provide ethical guidelines. Mediation
presents complex challenges for conventional ethics rules in matters such as
confidentiality, particularly when parties speak directly with one another.
Parties do not always speak only in the presence of their lawyers; therefore,
they may vitiate the lawyer-client privilege of confidentiality. Furthennore,
the mediator often offers a fonn of confidentiality that applies as between the
parties against the rest of the world and a fonn of confidentiality that applies
separately to each party in private caucus sessions. What duty of candor
should lawyers, parties, and mediators owe one another when Rule 3.3 does
not apply?60 As mediators work to effectuate their "magic"61 in facilitating
agreements, they confront issues regarding confidentiality, competence, fees,
conflicts of interests, whether they are practicing law in counseling, advising,
or drafting agreements,62 and whether they owe any duties to third parties. 63

58. There is a spirited debate among mediators about the differences between facilitated
mediation and mediation that is more "evaluative." See, e.g., Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P.
Love, Evaluative Mediation is an Oxymoron, 13 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LmG. 31 (1996)
(arguing that to remain "pure," mediators should "facilitate" but never "evaluate" the merits of
arguments, positions, or case quality (legality) of disputants in a mediation). Even in evaluative
mediation the mediator may evaluate the parties' arguments or claims and give them "reality
testing" about their respective positions. The parties, however, must still formulate a negotiated
agreement.
59. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2002) (eliminating the intermediary
rule found in the old Rule 2.2), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.2 (2001)
(permitting a lawyer to serve as an intermediary in limited circumstances). The former Rule 2.2
was loosely based on the practice of Louis Brandeis, who served as an intermediary in a
bankruptcy case and whose practice was described by others as "counsel for the situation." See
Clyde Spill enger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People's Lawyer, I 05 YALE
L.J.I44S, 1502-04 & 1502 n.194 (1996). This artful formulation ofa lawyer's potential role
is difficult to manage in practice, especially given the strong conflict of interest standards that
are still the hallmark of our adversarial system.
60. The Model Rules and the Restatement (Third) ofthe Law Governing Lawyers define
many duties as applying only to lawyers who appear before tribunals, which include lawyers in
binding arbitration but not in mediation. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0, 3.3
(2002); REsTATEMENT (lHIRD) OF THE LAW GoVERNING LAWYERS § 130 cmt. a (1998).
61. See, e.g.,John W. Cooley, Mediation Magic: Its Use and Abuse, 29 LoY. U.CHI.L.J.
I, 4-6 ( 1997) (discussing deception, its various forms, and whether it is an "acceptable or
unacceptable [form) of persuasion in mediation").
62. See Carrie Menke\-Meadow, Is Mediation the Practice ofLaw?, 14 ALTERNATIVES
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The most familiar third-party neutral role is that of the arbitrator. An
arbitrator decides matters involving fact, law, or a combination of both fact
and law and whether to enforce contracts, such as in labor or commercial
disputes. Although conducted in private with privately adopted rules of
procedure, evidence, and decision, the role of arbitrator is much like that of
judge with rules of conduct prescribed by the parties by their constitutive
contract or by the appointing arbitral institution. 64 Even the Model Rules 6s
and many state statutes66 have formerly recognized and prescribed some
guidance for the role of arbitrator.
Perhaps least familiar to most readers and central to my claims about the
new roles of lawyers as consensus builders is the role of lawyers as neutral
facilitators in consensus building or in the public-policy participatory fora.
These processes, which involve multiple and complex issues with more than
two parties, are hybrids of negotiation, case presentation, and often,
legislation and rule-drafting. As a result, such processes require skilled
facilitation and meeting management skills. Such innovative processes derive
their power from their ability to attract multiple stakeholders to the table to
debate policy issues, values, facts, and legal issues and disputes and when

TO HIGH COST LmG. 57 (1996); Bruce Myerson, Lawyers who Mediate are not Practicing Law,
14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 74 (1996).
63. The Model Rules do not tackle such complex issues of mediator ethics; however,
mediator ethics are handled in a variety of special ethical codes. See, e.g., MODEL STANDARDS
OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Am. Bar Ass'n, & Soc'y of Prof Is in
Dispute Resolution 1994) (specifically discussing in Principle III conflicts of interest for
mediators); CPR-Georgetown Comm'n on Ethics & Standards In ADR, Proposed Model Rule
ofProrl Conduct Rule 4.5 for The Lawyer as Third Party Neutral R. 4.5.3(a)(2) (Final Draft
2002), at http://www.cpradr.org (last visited Oct. 31, 2002) [hereinafter CPR-Georgetown
Proposed Rule 4.5] ("A lawyer serving in a third party neutral capacity should not allow other
matters to interfere with the lawyer's impartiality."). Increasingly, private professional
associations and states are developing ethical rules for mediators. See, e.g., TENN. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.4 (effective Mar. I, 2003) (prescribing the duties of lawyers who serve
as dispute-resolution neutrals).
64. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration and Related Dispute
Resolution Processes: What's Happening and What's Not, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 949, 958-61
(2002) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration].
65. Both the new and old versions of Rule 1.12 address conflicts of interest when one
member of a law firm acts as an arbitrator and the lawyer's partners seek to subsequently
represent one of the parties to the arbitration, usually in an unrelated matter. Compare MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.\ 2 (2002), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.12
(2001). Rule 1.12 has incorporated tile American (non-international) understanding of the
"partisan" arbitrator in three person arbitration panels, allowing the arbitrator, who is chosen
by the parties, to continue in a representational capacity for that party. Id.
66. Some states include arbitration in judicial codes of conduct because of the
adjudicatory function of arbitrators. More recently, however, some states have begun to
regulate the ethical obligations ofarbitrators separately. See, e.g., CAL. ETHICS STANDARDS FOR
NEUTRAl.. ARBITRATORS IN CONTRACTUAL ARBITRATION (Cal. Judicial Council 2002).
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successful, from their ability to reach a resolution that is often otherwise
impossible in more formal legal settings where party politics or adversarialism
often reduce the issues to binary and hotly contested alternatives. In the
regulatory setting, such mixed processes are used to develop regulatory
negotiations ("reg-neg" or negotiated rule-making)67 to assist participants in
arriving at agreements on environmental siting and clean-up plans, to
accommodate preservationist and development interests, to resolve ethnic,
community, and international disputes, and to develop budget allocations, as
well as future financial and strategic plans. When multiple levels of
government are involved in handling regulatory issues and other problems,
new forms of coordination, experimentation, and administrative practices
draw on the processes of stakeholder negotiation, facilitated and contingent
agreements, and party-negotiated plans and solutions. In our domain oflaw,
these practices have been labeled "democratic or constitutional
experimentalism,>68 because they challenge conventional notions of separation
of powers, federalism, and regulation by providing for more democratic
participation of parties and stakeholders in community problem solving and
administrative action and regulation.
At the process level, consensus building is a managed, deliberative, and
decision-making process in which a third-party neutral is usually hired to
perform conflict or issue assessment, to map potential interests and
stakeholders, and to design and implement a process of "convening"
representatives, groups, and constituencies to deliberate in a structured way
about how to make decisions (developing both "deliberation" or process rules
and decision rules) and what decisions to make. Structured discourse usually
requires the development of ground rules, which are "enforced" by the thirdparty conveners or facilitators, usually after adoption, negotiation, and
acceptance by the participants. 69 Participants are often trained in negotiation
skills before they begin so that a basic skill level is present. 70 Different kinds
ofdiscourse are allowed and encouraged in such proceedings. While the basic
justification is a Habermassian71 belief in the power of reasoned argument to

67. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLAL. REv. 1,33-55 (I 997)(discussingthe negotiated rule-making process); Philip J. Harter,
Negotiating Regulations: A Cure/or Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1,28-31 (1982) (discussing the
advantages of "developing rules through negotiation").
68. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution 0/ Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1998) (describing theories and examples of
administrative democracy).
69. See. e.g., Lawrence Susskind, An Alternative to Robert's Rules o/Order for Groups.
Organizations. and Ad Hoc Assemblies That Want to Operate By Consensus, in THE
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 3-5 (discussing Robert's Rules of Order
as a traditional model and means of enforcing order and decorum in a group setting and
describing and setting out alternatives thereto).
70. See id.
71. See HABERMAS, supra note 41.
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persuade others of the validity of a particular claim or value choice, other
fonns of discourse often emerge as well, including bargaining and trading and
appeals to beliefs, emotions, and so-called "a-rational" justifications72 for
particular choices that are made. Then rules of decision must be agreed to,
and, unlike more conventional legal processes of litigation (winllose
decision), negotiation (bi-Iateral agreement), or legislative action (majority
voting), these processes often use different decision rules ("consensus," which
is not necessarily unanimity but stronger than a majority), which require
different deliberation and voting procedures.
Frequently, "approved" decisions or policies may still require further and
fonnal legal approval by the appropriate legal agencies, such as zoning
boards, administrative agencies, and legislatures; however, with a committed
set of stakeholders who participated in the process, it is more likely that such
policy outputs will be accepted. 73 Sometimes reaching a decision is not even
a goal of a process that instead intends to broaden views, to educate
conflicting parties, or simply to enhance mutual understanding across diverse
and wide value divides. 74 Although such processes intend to encourage
greater democratic participation by those affected by decisions and policy
choices,75 the irony is that they still often require some leadership in
facilitation and action to be effective. 76 Regardless, these processes permit

72. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND: RATIONALITY AND THE EMOTIONS
286, 315-17 (1999) [hereinafter ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND] (discussing the traditional
view that emotions may be to blame for "irrationality" in decision-making); JON ELSTER,
SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS ON RATIONAUTY 17-26 (1989)
[hereinafter ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS] (discussing several varieties of irrationality).
73 . LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & LIORAZION, STRENGTHENING THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN
THE UNITED STATES: AN EXAMINATION OF RECENT EXPERIMENTS 21-30 (Mar. 2001)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Tennessee Law Review).
74. Examples of such wide and diverse value divides are found in the Public
Conversations Project's dialogues on abortion, gun control, and other highly controversial
issues. See, e.g., PUBUC CONVERSATIONS PROJECT, CONSTRUCTIVE CONVERSATIONS ABOUT
CHALLENGING TIMES: A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY DIALOGUE (2002) (describing procedures for
conducting a dialogue about a controversial subject with facilitation and ground rules but with
no decision rules or "action" plans).
75. See, e.g., ARCHONFUNG,ACCOUNTABLEAUTONOMY: PARTICIPATORYDEUBERATION
IN URBAN GoVERNANCE (Jan. 2002) (describing community participation and reform projects
in the Chicago schools and police department) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Tennessee Law Review); Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy:
Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance, 29 POL. &SOC'Y 5, 7 (2001) (discussing
reforms that "aspire to deepen the ways in which ordinary people can effectively participate in
and influence policies that directly affect their lives").
76. It is ironic that I am arguing for both more democratic group participation and
community participation in governance issues while arguing that a professional class oflawyers
may be appropriate or necessary to make that democracy work. Ian McEwan's character made
a similar observation after the would-be rescuers let go of the hot air balloon due to the lack of
organized action. See McEwAN, supra introductory quote, at 15-17. Lawrence Susskind calls
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deliberation and action across governmental units and agencies and are
especially useful for resolving interdisciplinary problems, such as
environmental problems, which may require the involvement of scientists and
other experts, as well as community members and professionals.
Nevertheless, critics argue that these democratic processes subvert and pacify
more active conflict and political action or that they may be manipulated by
those with more economic, political, or social power and capital. 77 Critics
also argue that these processes tend to localize and decentralize issues and
problems that should stay within national policy ambits or in public fora, such
as courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies. Some also claim that
these new processes are not demonstratively effective; 78 however, most agree
that it is too early to fully evaluate these innovative forms of action. 79
At the substantive level, these consensus-building or "empowered
deliberative democracy"BO practices have been employed in a variety of
matters, and the catalogues and descriptions of success stories are beginning
to make their way into print. BI In the legal arena, multi-party, multi-issue
consensus-building fora have been used for administrative rule-making in
occupational health and safety and environmental issues,82 environmental
siting and clean-up disputes (both before and during litigation),83 natural

this a "professionally facilitated dialogue"; however, he believes that the process would also
succeed with the leadership of professionals other than lawyers. SUSSKIND & ZION, supra note
73, at 24-30.
77. See. e.g., Iris Marion Young, Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy, 29 POL.
THEORY 670, 676-77 (2001) (arguing that the deliberative democratic process is not a good
recommendation for the ''real world" of politics where there are-many "power disparities"
among the parties).
78. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of
Negotiated Rulemalcing, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1335 (1997) ("While negotiated rulernaking seeks
to eliminate conflict, it also adds new sources of conflict and raises unrealistic expectations .

. . .").

79. See Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy
Benefit, 9 N.Y. U. ENVTL L.J. 60, 62 (2000); Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The
Actual Performance ofNegotiated Rulemalcing, 9 N.Y.V. ENVTL. L.J. 32, 33 (2000).
80. Fung & Wright, supra note 75.
81. See generallyCARMEN SIRIANNI & LEWIS FRIEDlAND, CMc INNovATION IN AMERICA:

COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT, PUBllC POllCY AND THE MOVEMENT FOR CMC RENEwAL (200 I)
(cataloguing a variety of examples of collaborative problem-solving processes at a variety of
civic levels in issues such as the environment, economic development, and public health); THE
CONSENSUS BUllDING HANDBOOK, supra note 44 (discussing the success ofconsensus building
in public health, affordable housing, superfund cleanups, and abortion).
82. See Freeman, supra note 67, at 33 n.84 (discussing consensus building and selfgovernance in areas such as the workplace); Harter, supra note 67, at 28-29 (discussing the
advantages of negotiation over the adversarial process in rule-making in the environmental
arena).
83. See.,e.g., Edward Scher, Negotiating Superfund Cleanup at the Massachusetts
Military Reservation, in THE CONSENSUS BUllDING HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 859-78.
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resource disputes,84 Indian reservation governance,8S constitution and city
charter drafting,86 and lawsuit settlements, including major mass tort class
actions. 87 Consensus-building strategies have also been used extensively in
state and local government policy development for such areas as
transportation,88 AIDs and health care policy,89 budget and block grant
allocations, affordable housing,90 and community revitalization and economic

84. See, e.g., Judith E. Innes & Sarah Connick, San Francisco Estuary Project, in THE
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 801-27 (discussing the successful use of
consensus building among "[eJnvironmentalists, agricultural and urban water users, business
groups, and development interests" in the estuary context); Janet C. Neuman, Run, River, Run:
Mediation ofa Water-Rights Dispute Keeps Fish and Farmers Happy-fora Time, 67 U. COLO.
L. REv. 259 (1996) (discussing mediation between Native Americans, farmers, and others in the
context of water rights).
85. See, e.g., Jan Jung-Min Sunoo & Juliette A. Falkner, Regulatory Negotiations: The
Native American Experience, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 90122 (discussing "the largest negotiated rulemaking" process among "Indian tribes and tribal
organizations" and "federal agencies and offices").
86. See, e.g., Kate Connolly, From City Hall to the Streets: A Community Plan Meets the
Real World, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 969-84 (describing a
plan to revitalize the city, which involved a "strategy ... built on the idea of partnership
development, which meant that the ... City Council and the community at large would share
responsibility for the development and implementation of the plan") (emphasis omitted); Susan
L. Podziba, The Chelsea Charter Consensus Process, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK,
supra note 44, at 743-72 ("The Chelsea Charter Consensus Process, which took place from
October 1993 through June 1994, was a public consensus building process designed to engage
a politically disillusioned community in the formation of its new local government. ").
87. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989) (involving the Dalkon
Shield contraception device); In re Dow Coming Corp., 187 B.R. 934 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995)
(involving breast implant litigation); In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 122 B.R. 6
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990) (involving asbestos litigation).
88. See, e.g., POuey CONSENSUS INITIATNE, NEGOTIATING TRANSPORTATION Pouey
RULES IN OREGON (2000) (using consensus building processes to develop freeway access
regulations).
89. See, e.g., SIRIANNI & FRIEDLAND, supra note 81, at 138-85 (discussing community
health and "citizen organizing in the health arena"); Michael A. Hughes et aI., Facilitating
Statewide HIVIAIDS Policies and Priorities in Colorado, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING
HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 1011-29 (describing "a consensus building process for HIV
prevention strategies in" Colorado); Sarah McKeaman & Patrick Field, The Northern Oxford
County Coalition: Four Maine Towns Tackle a Public Health Mystery, in THE CONSENSUS
BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 711-41 ("With leadership from the Maine Department
of Environmental Protection (DEP) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), town
residents on different sides ofthe debate came together in 1994 to initiate a community-based
consensus building process.").
90. See, e.g., Lawrence Susskind & Susan L. Podziba, Affordable Housing Mediation:
Building Consensus for Regional Agreements in the Hartford Area, in THE CONSENSUS
Bun.olNG HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 773-99 ("[AJ 1988 Connecticut state program ...
initiated a consensus building process to address the housing crisis in the area." Eventually, "a
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development. 91 At less concrete levels of action, such processes have also
shown promise in "managing," if not resolving, racial, ethnic, and crosscultural disputes within particular communities. 92 Moreover, at the
international level, the same techniques have served as the foundations for
"truth and reconciliation commissions" designed to provide opportunities for
the expression of injustices so as to promote healing and to facilitate the coexistence of groups that have engaged in violence and other wrongs against
one another. 93
Facilitating processes are now used to resolve past "wrongs" and to
elaborate plans for the future, such as in strategic planning for corporations,94
organizations, governments, entities, and institutions. Indeed, it is the ability
to distinguish between punishment for past harms and planning for future
relationships, as distinct from conventional forms oflitigation and other forms
of legal action, that is the hallmark of these newer forms of ADR. Dispute
resolution and prevention services also distinguish "ad hoc" groups and "oneshot" issues from more permanent, ongoing organizations and relational
"webs," the latter of which may require different processes, including the
provision of "system design'>9S services that help organizations develop

compromise bill passed, creating a pilot program to encourage municipalities, with the help of
mediators, to negotiate regional affordable housing plans. ").
91. See, e.g., SIRlANNI & FRIEDLAND, supra note 81, at 35-84 (discussing community
organizing and development); John Parr, The Chattanooga Process: A City's Vision is
Realized, in THE CONSENSUS BUIlDING HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 951-68 ("From recovering
the river to revitalizing the downtown to creating affordable housing, Chattanooga's list of
collaboratively solved problems is impressive. ").
92. See, e.g., Norman Dale, Cross-Cultural Community-Based Planning: Negotiating
the Future ofHaida Gwaii (British Columbia), in THE CONSENSUS BUIlDING HANDBOOK, supra
note 45, at 923-50 ("[E]xplicit negotiations have become the most favored means of resolving
long-standing conflicts between Canada's Native peoples (generally referred to as First Nations)
and non-Native parties, including governments, other communities, interest groups, and
industry. ").
93. See, e.g., SUSAN COllIN MARKS, WATCHING THE WIND: CONFUCT RESOLUTION
DURING SOUTH AFRICA'S TRANSmON TO DEMOCRACY 181-82 (2000) (discussing the Peace
Accord and reconciliation in South Africa); MARTHA MINow, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND
FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFrER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998) (describing
South Africa's truth and reconciliation process as one alternative to criminal trials).
94. See, e.g., Judy Mares-Dixon et aI., BUilding Consensus for Change within a Major
Corporation: The Case ofLevi Strauss & Co., in THE CONSENSUS BUllDING HANDBOOK, supra
note 44, at I 065-86 (discussing Levi Strauss & Co. 's pride in "its consensus-based management
approach"). The Association of American Law Schools has trained a cadre of law professors
as facilitators to guide such strategic planning processes in law school planning.
95. See, e.g., CATHY A. CONSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY
ORGANIZATIONS 22-24 (1996) (discussing the recent recognition of the conflict management
system's effectiveness in organizations); WllllAM L. URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLYEO:
DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CuT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT 42 (2d ed. 1993 ) (discussing the "basic
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internal systems for orderly, participatory dispute processing.
At the most innovative levels, these processes have been used to facilitate
"public conversations" about highly controversial matters such as abortion96
and affirmative action 97 where no decisions are made but where political
discourse is structured to encourage communication and prevent further
polarization between the parties. 98 Although such an approach may not lead
directly to conflict resolution, it allows for a variety of views to be expressed
in a pluralistic and democratic society. At the institutional level, these
processes have been used to develop new and more "permanent" forms of
decision-making bodies in settings that use the "reg-neg,099 approach in the
administrative context and "problem-solving courts" in the judicial system.
"Problem-solving courts" now attempt to "manage" certain legal issues, such
as family, including such issues as neglect, domestic violence, divorce, and
custody, with a multi-disciplinary "problem-solving" approach within a single
court. 100
Because participation in new processes for legal problem solving places
lawyers in alternative roles, new forms of training and skills development are
crucial. As a neutral, the third-party facilitator must know how to maintain
process neutrality, often in the face of heated debate and value-based
commitments,IOI know how to develop and then enforce process and ground

principles of dispute systems design").
96. See, e.g., Michelle LeBaron & Nike Carstarphen, Finding Common Ground on
Abortion, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 1033 (discussing
consensus processes that were designed to facilitate dialogue "among pro-life and pro-choice
supporters" in "at least 20 cities").
97. For a discussion of "deliberative conversation" on affirmative action, see MenkelMeadow, Trouble with the Advocacy System, supra note 14, at 33-38.
98. See generally DEBORAHTANNEN, THE ARGUMENT CULTURE: MOVING FROM DEBATE
TO DIALOGUE (1998) (discussing how the adversarial system and agonistic arguments have
dominated law, education,journalism, politics, and American culture and served to polarize and
simplify subjects that require complex and multi-sided understanding).
99. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 569-84 (2000) (encouraging negotiated rule-making and addressing
issues relevant to arbitration proceedings). See also Philip J. Harter & Charles Pou, Jr., Using
Negotiated Rulemaking Effectively, in FEDERAL AoMINISTRATNE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
DESKBooK 111-34 (Marshall Breger et al. eds., 2001) ("[T]he 'regulatory negotiation' ...
recognizes the political nature of the regulatory process and seeks to adopt the philosophy of
the alternative dispute resolution movement to public policy making.").
100. See Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A BriefPrimer, 23 L.
& POL'y 125, 126-27 (2001); Michael Dorf & Charles Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and
Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REv. 831, 852 (2000); Deborah Epstein,
Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors,
Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 28-34 (1999); Judith Kaye,
Changing Courts in Changing Times: The Need for a Fresh Look at How Courts are Run, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 851, 862 (1997).
101. See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE:
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 179 (1987) (discussing how a
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rules for discussion, know how to identify and invite the appropriate
stakeholders to a particular problem, understand complex negotiation and
coalition bargaining behaviors and dynamics,102 understand and prevent
manipulation of voting strategies involved in the development of appropriate
decision rules, guide and facilitate groups and constituents in their
deliberations,103 which often entails knowing when to engage in public and
transparent processes and when to use confidential or "second-track"
processes, 104 and ultimately, to assist in the development of "implementable,"
"reality-tested" decisions or, at least, "contingent"IOS solutions for particular
problems. Thus, lawyers who engage in such processes as neutrals will
require training in meeting management and facilitation. I06 Also important is
a degree of knowledge regarding the sociology and psychology of group
behavior,107 as well as economics, political science, the psychology of

neutral must "switch[] gears" in a zero-sum situation "to introduc[e] the possibility of trading
things, especially things that the parties value differently"); LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & PATRICK
FIELD, DEALING WITH AN ANGRY PUBliC: THE MUTUAL GAINS APPROACH TO RESOLVING
DISPUTES 154-55 (1996) (contrasting "interests" and "values"; "[W]hile interests are about what
we want, values are about what we care about and what we stand for").
102. See LEIGH'fiIOMPSON, THE MIND ANDHEARTOFTHE NEGOTIATOR 140-67 (2000);
Gary Goodpaster, Coalitions and Representative Bargaining, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. REsol.
243,245-47 (1994); see, e.g., James K. Sebenius, Sequencing to Building Coalitions: With
Whom Should I Talk First?, in WISE CHOICES: DECISIONS, GAMES, AND NEGOTIATIONS
(Richard J. Zeckhauser et al. eds., 1996) (stating that "[s]equencing choices can be a prominent
feature of coalition building"); Cass Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to
Extremes, 110 YAlE L.J. 71 (2000) (discussing group polarization).
103. Contrast ROBERT'S RUlES OF ORDER (Sarah Corbin Robert ed., 9th ed. 1990) (1876)
(containing majority-based decision-making rules), with SUSSKIND & ZION, supra note 73, at
I, 21 (pointing out that "representative democracy in the United States falls short of our ideals
in numerous ways" including "excessive reliance on majority rule, and a lack of emphasis on
forging political consensus").
104. "Second-track" or "dual track" negotiation (confidential and secret negotiations) was
developed in the formal world of international diplomacy; however, second-track negotiation
is used frequently in legal disputes and in confidential mediation sessions known as caucusing.
See, e.g., RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFlICTS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEDIATION
2 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 1996) (analyzing the effectiveness of mediation in the context of
international dispute management and resolution); WORDS OVER WAR: MEDIATION AND
ARBITRATION TO PREVENT DEADLY CONFlICT (Melanie C. Greenberg et at. eds., 2000).
105. See, e.g., DAVID LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR:
BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 97-98 ( 1986) (discussing the creation
of contingent agreements).
106. See JENNIFER E. BEER & EILEEN STIEF, PEACEMAKING IN YoUR NEIGHBORHOOD:
MODERATOR'S HANDBOOK (1982); TiM HINDLE, MANAGING MEETINGS (1998); ROGER M.
SCHWARZ, THE SKILlED FACIlITATOR: PRACTICAl WISDOM FOR DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE
GROUPS (1994).
107. See, e.g., JOSEPH LUFf, GROUP PROCESSES: AN INTRODUCTION TO GROUP DYNAMICS
16-35 (1963).
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strategic voting,108 negotiation,I09 mediation,llo bargaining behaviors, and
decision science. III
Lawyers who serve, not as neutrals, but as representatives of parties in
such processes will also have to learn new skills and bodies of knowledge to
serve as "representatives" who are not only adversarial advocates, but are also
wise counselors and problem solvers I12 in processes that call for different
kinds of participation in creative thinking, communication facilitation,
coordination with clients and others, and joint problem solving with others. lll
The role of the lawyer-as-neutral and the lawyer-as-representative in these
new forms of dispute resolution and policy and transaction formation requires
different ethical guidelines than those of the traditional adversariallawyer.
108. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR mE SOCIAL SCIENCES 155-58 (\ 989);
ELSTER, SOLOMONlC JUDGMENTS, supra note 72, at 85-92 (discussing the advantages ofiottery
voting, which include "reconcil[ing] honesty with self-interest; reducing the number of wasted
votes; increasing representation of minority views in elections; and preventing the rise of
professional politicians"); Thompson, supra note 102, at 154-56 (describing different voting
strategies).
109. See, e.g., FISHERET Al.., supra note 37, at 40 (discussing the process and the multiple
facets of negotiation); MNooKlN ET Al.., supra note 17, at 3 (discussing how "[n]egotiation is
central to lawyering" and how lawyers can use negotiating skills to "help people construct fair
and durable commitments, feel protected, recover from loss, and resolve disputes"); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem
Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754, 764, 795 (1984) (comparing the ''traditional'' adversarial model
of negotiation with a problem solving approach to negotiation and suggesting that the problem
solving approach "presents opportunities for discovering greater numbers of and better quality
solutions").
110. See generally CHRISTOPHER MOORE, 1lIE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAl.
STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT (2d ed. 1996) (describing the stages and functions of the
mediation process).
Ill. See, e.g., MAXH. BAZERMAN,JUDGMENTIN MANAGERlALDECISIONMAKING (5th ed.
2002) (describing both rational and "distorted" decision-making processes); JOHN S. HAMMOND
ET Al.., SMART CHOICES: A PRACTICAl. GUIDE TO MAKING BETTER DECISIONS (1999)
(describing rational decision-making strategies using risk analysis and quantitative analysis).
112. See generally JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE WISE ADVISOR: WHAT EVERY
PROFESSIONAl. SHOULD KNow ABOUT CONSULTING AND COUNSELING (2000) (discussing how
to give effective advice as a professional).
113. See e.g., James K.L. Lawrence, Mediation Advocacy: Parlnering with the Mediator,
15 Omo ST. J. ON DISP. REsoL. 425,425-26 (2000) (discussing the need for lawyers to acquire
skills other than those traditionally used in the courtroom); Jean R. Stemlight, Lawyers'
Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and Psychology to Structure
Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 Omo ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 269, 271 (1999)
(discussing the need for lawyers to "redefine their method of advocacy or role to fit the
mediation forum"); Gerald R. Williams, Negotiation as a Healing Process, 1996 J. DISP. REsoL.
1, 56-66 (describing "six qualities" that are important for lawyers representing clients in
negotiation); cf Elizabeth Ellen Gordon, Attorneys' Negotiation Strategies in Mediation:
BUSiness as Usual?, 17 MEDIAnON Q. 377, 378 (2000) (setting forth empirical data concerning
"the impact of mediation on legal negotiation").
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A review of the ethics issues surrounding these new fonns of ADR follows
below.

m.

ETHICS ISSUES FOR THE LAWYER AS CONSENSUS BUILDER AND DISPUTE
RESOLVER

I have argued in a variety of fora for recognition of the ethical dilemmas
that lawyers face while serving in third-party neutral roles and in
representative capacities in dispute resolution or consensus-building fora,
which are distinguishable from conventional legal and more adversarial
roles. 114 As chair of the CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and

114. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, Morality and Professional Responsibility
in Negotiation, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION Enncs 119 (Phyllis Bernard & Bryant Garth eds.,
2002); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Limits of Adversarial Ethics, in Enncs IN PRACTICE:
LAWYERS' ROLES, RESPONsmILITIES, AND REGULATION 123 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000)
(describing the differences in "ethics" ofnon-adversariaI roles from the assumptions oflawyers'
ethics of traditional roles); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in ADR: The Many "Cs" of
Professional Responsibility and Dispute Resolution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 979,981-87 (2001 )
(discussing four ethical issues confronting the practice of ADR: counseling, confidentiality,
conflicts of interest, and conflicts of law); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative
Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers'
Responsibilities, 38 S. TEx. L. REv. 407,409 (1997) (explaining that the current ethical rules
for lawyers are inadequate to address the role of lawyers who serve as third-party neutrals);
Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration, supra note 64, at 958-61; Carrie MenkelMeadow, Ethics and Professionalism in Non-Adversarial Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
153,154 (1999) (noting that the current "rules of professionalism" for lawyers as advocates do
not sufficiently address issues confronting lawyers serving in other roles); Menkel-Meadow,
Ethics and the Settlements ofMass Torts, supra note 11, at 1160-61 (discussing ethical issues
surrounding settlements of mass torts); Carrie Menke1-Meadow, Ex Parte Talks With Neutrals:
ADR Hazards, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 109, 117 (1994) (discussing the.
possibility of ethics rules that address ex parte communications in ADR); Carrie MenkelMeadow, Is Mediation the Practice of Law?, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 57, 60
(1996) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the Practice ofLaw?](discussing the lack
of guidance that legal ethics codes provide to lawyers who serve as mediators); Carrie Menke1Meadow, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral: Creativity and NonPartisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L. REv. 785, 785 (1999) (suggesting that the conception
of the lawyer's role as advocate should be broadened); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ProfeSSional
Responsibility for Third-Party Neutrals, 11 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 129, 131
( 1993) (discussing the absence of a clear consensus on ethical rules for third-party neutrals);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Silences of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers:
Lawyering as Only Adversary Practice, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 631,632 (1997) (recognizing
that the Restatement (Third) ofthe Law Governing Lawyers fails to address issues confronting
third-party neutrals, among others); Carrie Menke1-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets
Disputes ofIts Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLAL. REv. 1871, 1911-22
(1997) (addressing ethical standards in ADR); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in ADR
Representation: A Road Map of Critical Issues, DISP. REsoL. MAG., Winter 1997, at 3
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Standards in ADR ("CPR-Georgetown Commission"), I testified before the
ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission, which was charged with redrafting the
Model Rules, and urged the Commission to consider the ethical dilemmas that
challenge lawyers who serve as third-party neutrals. The CPR-Georgetown
Commission has drafted a proposed Model Rule to govern lawyers who serve
as third-party neutrals. The proposed Model Rule addresses such issues as
competence, diligence, fees, impartiality, conflicts of interest, and the fairness
and integrity of the process. I IS Despite a great deal of lobbying activity by
mediators, arbitrators, and third-party neutral organizations and the existence
of ethical codes that offer guidance for mediators 1l6 and arbitrators,1l7 the
ABA Ethics 2000 Commission adopted a de minimis approach to deal with
ethics issues in the practice of dispute resolution.
The Ethics 2000 Commission recommended three changes to the Model
Rules. The ABA House of Delegates approved the changes in February 2002,
perhaps reflecting at least some recognition of ethics issues involving lawyers
engaged in dispute resolution. The Preamble to the Model Rules reflects the
role of the lawyer as a third-party neutral by stating that: "[i]n addition to
these representational functions, a lawyer may serve as a third-party neutral,
a non-representational role helping the parties to resolve a dispute or other
matter. Some of these Rules apply directly to the lawyer who are or have
served as third-party neutrals."lls In addition, revised Rule 2.4 fonnally
recognizes the role of lawyers as 'third-party neutrals by stating:
(a) A lawyer serves as a third-party neutral when the lawyer assists two or
more persons who are not clients of the lawyer to reach a resolution of a
dispute or other matter that has arisen between them. Service as a third-party
neutral may include service as an arbitrator, a mediator or in such other
capacity as will enable the lawyer to assist the parties to resolve the matter.

(b) A lawyer serving as a third-party neutral shall inform unrepresented
parties that the lawyer is not representing them. When the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that a party does not understand the lawyer's role
in the matter, the lawyer shall explain the difference between the lawyer's
role as a third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as one who represents a
(considering whether a lawyer who serves as an ADR representative should follow different
ethical standards than one who serves in the traditional role as advocate).
115. CPR-Georgetown Proposed Rule 4.5, supra note 63.
116. See. e.g., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDlATORS (Am. Arbitration Ass'n,
Am. Bar Ass'n, & Soc'y of Prof Is in Dispute Resolution 1994).
117. See. e.g., CODE OF Enncs FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (Am.
Arbitration Ass'n & Am. Bar Ass'n 1977) (being currently revised by committees of the
American Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association Sections of Dispute
Resolution, Business Law, and International Law, and the Center for Public Resources); see
also RULES OF Enncs FOR INT'L ARBITRATORS (Int'l Bar Ass'n 1986).
118. See MODEL RUlES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. , 3 (2002) (citing id. R. 1.12,2.4
(2002»).
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client. 119

Comment [3] to Rule 2.4 discusses the different responsibilities of lawyers
and non-lawyers serving as third-party neutrals and requires lawyers serving
as neutrals to disclose that they are not representing parties to a dispute
resolution event. 120 Comment [5] to Rule 2.4 also states that the lawyer who
is serving as a representative of clients in arbitration or mediation has
different duties of candor. 121 When appearing before a binding arbitration
panel, the lawyer-representative has the full duty of candor before a
"tribunal"122 under Rule 3.3;123 however, when appearing in a mediation
proceeding, the duty of candor is governed by Rule 4.1,124 thus formalizing a
different standard of candor in different dispute-resolution fora. 125
Rule 1.12 addresses conflicts of interest that occur when a former judge,
arbitrator, mediator, or other third-party neutral works as a neutral (or law
clerk) on a matter where parties to that matter seek subsequent representation
in that matter or another from a law firm for which the mediator works. 126 The
revised rule follows the old rule and allows a former judge, arbitrator, or
mediator to serve as a representative only after receiving informed consent in
writing from all parties. 127 In the event that a former judge, arbitrator, or
mediator is disqualified from representation in a matter pursuant to Rule

119. [d. R. 2.4.
120. See id. R. 2.4 emt. [3].
121. See id. R. 2.4 emt. [5].
122. Tribunal is defined in Rule 1.0(m) as "a court, an arbitrator in a binding arbitration
proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative
capacity." [d. R. 1.0(m).
123. Rule 3.3 requires, among other things, that a lawyer disclose adverse controlling
authority. See id. R. 3.3.
124. Rule 4.1 bars lawyers from knowingly making "a false statement of material fact or
law to a third person" or "fail[ing] to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited .... " Id.
R.4.1.
125. Like the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, the Model Rules
distinguishes between the varying "tribunals," which include binding arbitration and other fora
of legal dispute settlement, such as mediation-treated like private negotiation-and dispute
settlement with a "reduced" duty of candor to an "adversary" or non-decisional facilitator.
Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch. 7, introductory note
(1998) (stating that
[t]he Chapter addresses situations. -. . in which the lawyer is 'representing a client in a
matter before a tribunal.' . .. Thus ... the Chapter would be applicable in contested
arbitration and similar trial-type proceedings, but it would not be applicable to a mediation
(except mediation in the form ofa mock trial or similar contested proceeding»,
with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3, 4.1 (addressing situations in which a lawyer
appears before a binding arbitration panel or appears in a mediation proceeding).
126. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.12(a), (d).
127. See id. R. 1.12(a).
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1.12(a), partners in the fonner judge's, arbitrator's, or mediator's law finn
may represent parties to that matter only with proper "screening."128
Screening of otherwise disqualified third-party neutrals, a hotly contested
ethical issue in deliberations concerning the ethics of conflict resolution, is
intended to encourage law firms to allow lawyers in the same finn to serve as
third-party neutrals and representatives.129 Comment [2] to Rule 1.12
recognizes that "[0]ther law or codes of ethics governing third-party neutrals
may impose more stringent standards of personal or imputed
disqualification."13o Rule 1. 12(d) continues to recognize the role ofa partychosen ''partisan'' arbitrator on a multi-member arbitration panel who is
allowed to subsequently represent the party in the same matter. 131
The Ethics 2000 Commission at least recognized the existence oflawyers
serving as third-party neutrals; however, it failed to take a specific stand about
a wide variety of potential ethical issues facing third-party neutrals and
representatives in dispute-resolution activities. In failing to take such a stand,
the Ethics 2000 Commission's revision of the Model Rules left out what I call
the "many 'Cs'" of dispute-resolution ethics.

128. Id. R. 1.12(c). The requirements for screening are provided for in the Model Rules.
Id. R. 1.0(k).
129. See generally CPR-Georgetown Proposed Rule 4.5, supra note 63.
130. MODELRUl.ES OF PROF'LCONDUCT R. 1.12 cmt. [2] (citing id. R. 2.4).
131. Id. R. 1.l2(d). The role of the "non-neutral" partisan arbitrator is a feature of

American commercial and labor arbitration and is becoming increasingly controversial in both
domestic and international commercial arbitration. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, The Last Thing
Dispute Resolution Needs is Two Sets ofLawyersfor Each Party, in INTO THE 21 ST CENTURY:
THOUGHT PIECES ON LAWYERING, PROBLEM SOLVING AND ADR 48 (CPR lnst. for Dispute
Resolution 2001) ("Quite simply, it is impossible to reconcile an obligation as an advocate with
the role of impartial decision-maker."); Deseriee A. Kennedy, Predisposed with Integrity: The
Elusive Quest for Justice in Tripartite Arbitrations, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL Enncs 749, 750 (1995)
(stating that U[i]n tripartite panel arbitrations, under the rules of the American Arbitration
Association (AAA), party-appointed arbitrators are permitted and even encouraged to be
predisposed toward the position of their nominating party''). Many private international bodies
of commercial arbitration have begun to limit severely or ban altogether the function of the
partisan arbitrator; once chosen by the parties, all arbitrators are to behave as "neutrals." See,
e.g., CPR RULES FOR NON-ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION R. 7.3 (CPR lnst. for Dispute
Resolution 2000) ("Each arbitrator shall disclose ... any circumstances that might give rise to
justifiable doubt regarding the arbitrator's independence or impartiality.''); James H. Carter,
Improving Life with the Party-Appointed Arbitrator: Clearer Conduct Guidelines for
"NonNeutrals," II AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 295, 298-99 (2000) (questioning the wisdom of
"overtly partisan" arbitrators and pointing out that U[p]rominent rules used in international
arbitrations provide expressly that all arbitrators, including those appointed by the parties, must
be impartial and independent."); see also Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration, supra
note 64; cf Delta Mine Holding Co. v. AFC Coal Props., Inc., 280 F.3d 815, 822 (8th Cir.
200 I ) (stating that "[w]here the parties have expressly agreed to select partial party arbitrators,
the award should be confinned unless the objecting party proves that the party arbitrator'S
partiality prejudicially affected the award").

HeinOnline -- 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 87 2002-2003

88

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:63

A. Counseling, Communication, and Comparisons

Many dispute-resolution professionals have called for a fonnal ethical rule
that would require lawyers to counsel clients about the availability of legal
services beyond litigation and the more conventional forms of disputeresolution. A few states have enacted mandatory counseling rules, and many
more states have used precatory language to suggest that lawyers should
inform their clients of the many ways to solve a legal problem. In The duty to
inform clients is included within the obligation to communicate with clients
about the means chosen to effectuate their objectives. 133 While some think
that it is unethical for a lawyer not to review other forms of dispute-resolution
due to the lawyer's presumed conflict of interest in increased litigation fees, 134
others suggest that the increased cost of counseling sessions required to
compare adequately all of the possible forms of ADR and litigation might be
prohibitive. 13s
B. Consent, Choice, or Coercion:

Of Courts and Contracts

While the animating impulse behind most of the "ADR movement" has
advocated for client choice in dispute resolution and "self-determination" in
mediation, 136 parties are increasingly ordered into arbitration or mediation by
pre-dispute contract clause assignments or court rules that require an ADR
procedure before trial. The United States Supreme Court has sustained most
contractual arbitration clauses l3 ? against a variety of challenges, and most

132. For a review of these provisions, see Marshall J. Breger, Should an Attorney be
Required to Advise a Client ofADR Options?, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427, 433-36 (2000);
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Professional Rules andADR: Control ofAlternative Dispute Resolution
Under the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission Proposal and Other Professional Responsibility
Standards, 28 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 895, 902-06 (2001).
133. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2.
134. EDWARD J. BRUNET AND CHARLEs B. CRAVER, ALTERNATNE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
THE ADVOCATE'S PERSPECTNE 250 (2001).
135. See, e.g., Frank E.A. Sander & Michael L. Prigoff, Should There Be a Duty to Advise
ofADR Options?, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1990, at 51 (debating the argument that the additional costs
associated with a lawyer explaining all options concerning ADR to clients would be an
unreasonable burden on lawyers).
136. See, e.g., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Principle I (Am.
Arbitration Ass'n, Am. Bar Ass'n, & Soc'y of Profls in Dispute Resolution 1994) ("A
Mediator shall Recognize that Mediation is Based on the Principle of Self-Determination by the
Parties. ").
137. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 82-83,92 (2000)
(upholding a mobile home financing agreement that req uired disputes to be resolved by binding
arbitration); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,23 (1991) (holding that "a
claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ... can be subjected to
compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a securities registration
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courts have rej ected claims that court-annexed arbitration violates the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial. 138 Nevertheless, many legal scholars and
lawyer-activists have denounced these trends, which are perceived as more
"coercive," rather than freely-chosen, dispute-resolution processes. 139 Efforts
continue in the courts, as well as in legislatures, to have such clauses declared
unconscionable or unenforceable as adhesion contracts 140 and to prohibit
mandatory arbitration or mediation in a wide variety of disputes ranging from
consumer, employment, and health care issues. 141 Some have asked whether

application"). Contra Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 2002)
(reversing "the order compelling arbitration" and finding the Circuit City Dispute Resolution
Agreement "an unconscionable contract of adhesion").
138. See Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The
Constitutional Issues, 68 OR. L. REV. 487, 503-08 (1989). Contra Richard C. Reuben,
Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory ofAlternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil
Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949,956-57 (2000) (contending that "constitutional values" in ADR
are "achievable, necessary, and desirable"); Jean Stern light, Rethinking the Constitutionality of
the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment ofJury Trial,
Separation ofPowers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TuL. L. REv. 1,69-78 ( 1997) (stating that
a preference for binding arbitration rather than litigation violates the Seventh Amendment in
cases where the party is entitled to a jury trial).
139. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, in 1996
SUP. CT. REv. 331-32 (criticizing the Supreme Court's decisions regarding commercial
arbitration agreements); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come out Ahead in
Alternative Justice Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. REsOL. 19, 26
(1999) (discussing whether the "haves" hold an advantage in ADR); Jean R. Sternlight,
Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding
Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637,638-39 (1996) (criticizing the preference the Supreme
Court gives to arbitration agreements, even when consumers do not know what they are
signing); Katherine Van Wetzel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the
Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REv. 703 (1999) (discussing the expanding scope of
arbitration under the Act and concluding that "the Supreme Court's expansive doctrines, when
applied to consumer transactions, contravene the statute's intent and undermine many important
due process and substantive rights"); Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected
Mediation: What'sJustice Gotto Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 788 (2001)(stating that
"dispute resolution procedure increasingly resembles a traditional bilateral negotiation session
between attorneys").
140. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, 279 F.3d. at 891,896 (finding that the "Circuit City
Dispute Resolution Agreement" was "an unconstitutional contract of adhesion" and reversing
"the order compelling arbitration"); see also Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs.,
Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 674 (Cal. 2000) (reversing the order to enforce the arbitration agreement and
finding the arbitration agreement "unconscionably unilateral"); Engalla v. Permanente Med.
Group, 938 P.2d 903, 927 (Cal. 1997) (stating that
[p]rivate arbitration may resolve disputes faster and cheaper than judicial proceedings.
Private arbitration, however, may also become an instrument of injustice imposed on a 'take
it or leave it' basis. The courts must ... ensure that private arbitration systems resolve
disputes not only with speed and economy but also with fairness).
141. See, e.g., Consumer Fairness Act of2002, H.R. 5162, 107th Congo § 1003(a)(2002)
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it is unethical or unconscionable for a lawyer to draft such a "one-sided
clause" in a contract when the drafter should know that the other party
probably does not understand the ramifications of the agreement. 142 These
"ethical" concerns go to the very core of the legitimacy and acceptability of
dispute-resolution processes and the role of the lawyer in participating in
processes that are regarded by many as unfair or violative of due process
protections in the public sphere.

C. Competence, Credentialing, and Qualifications
Although most ethics codes enforce only a minimal level of "competence"
and usually proclaim that ethics standards are not to be used to establish
professional civil liability standards for malpractice,143 a question remains
regarding what levels of minimal competence and diligence should be
suggested in ethical codes regarding dispute-resolution services. In fields like
mediation and arbitration that do not yet carry formal procedures for licensing
and credentialing,l44 the question is whether ethics codes should be used to
enforce a basic level of service, particularly in light of many courts holding
that both arbitrators and mediators are "immune" from liability because of
their performance of "quasi-judicial" functions.14s Indeed, the question of
what professional ethics codes should regulate these "mixed" or hybrid
professions, where practitioners come from a variety of disciplines, is also
considered in the debate concerning whether mediation is the practice of
law l46 and thus subject to ethics rules for lawyers, and in the debate
concerning whether mediation is performed at all when third-party neutrals
legally evaluate a case rather than simply "facilitate" negotiations and
communications between parties. 147

(declaring arbitration clauses unenforceable as an unfair trade practice in consumer
transactions); Preservation of Civil Rights Protections Act of200l, H.R. 2282, \o7th Congo §
3 (2001) (declaring unenforceable claims based on federal law arbitration clauses in
employment contracts).
142. See BRUNET & CRAVER, supra note 134, at 174-75.
143. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDUCT pmb\. ., 20 (2002).
144. See COMM'N ON QUALIFICATIONS, SOC'Y OF PROF'LS IN DISPUTE REsOLUTION,
QUALIFYING NEUTRALS: THE BASIC PRINCIPLES (1989).
145. See, e.g., Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding ''that
absolute quasi-judicial immunity extends to mediators and case evaluators"); Howard v.
Drapkin, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893,903 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding ''that absolute quasi-judicial
inununity is properly extended to ... neutral third-parties").
146. See Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the Practice 0/ law?, supra note 114; Bruce
Meyerson, Lawyers Who Mediate Are Not Practicing Law, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 74, 74 (1996); Joshua R. Schwartz, Layman Cannot Lawyer, But Is Mediation the
Practice a/Law?, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 1715, 1745-46 (1999).
147. See Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Evaluative Mediation is an Oxymoron, 13
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 31 (I996); Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus
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D. Confidentiality
Traditional lawyer ethics rules protect lawyer--client confidentialityl48 and
evidentiary privilege; however, in mediation and arbitration, the parties and
their lawyers usually appear before a third-party neutral, thereby eliminating
traditional confidentiality protections. Confidentiality is protected in
mediation and arbitration most often by a contract among the parties and the
third-party neutral. Increasingly, at least with mediation, confidentiality is
protected by statute 149 or common-law privilege. Confidentiality in mediation
is complex because mediators often promise parties confidentiality in separate
caucus sessions. Mediators can use different versions of promises about what
they will reveal to the parties outside the caucus session. Thus, many
mediator and arbitrator ethics rules will simply guarantee whatever
confidentiality the parties and the third-party neutral promise each other,
subject to applicable law.
Recently, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association
approved the Uniform Mediation Act to provide uniformity under state law in
confidentiality protections and exceptions. However, whether a mediator may
be called to testify about the existence or validity of a contract or whether an
arbitrator may be called upon when arbitration awards are challenged may be
a matter of federal law when cases are brought to federal court. ISO
Confidentiality protections, whether based on evidentiary privilege,
contract, or statute, may be waived pursuant to certain exceptions. For
example, confidentiality may be waived in order to warn that someone may
cause serious bodily harm to another. Moreover, disclosure of confidential
information may be required to report crimes, such as child abuse or domestic
violence. The Ethics 2000 Commission revisited these issues in its redrafting
of Rule 1.6; however, recent developments at the federal level demonstrate the

Evaluative Mediator Orientations: Piercing the "Grid" Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 985, 988
(1997).
148. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002). Rule 1.6 has always been
subject to controversies about when disclosure of client misconduct to prevent a future serious
crime of bodily hann or economic fraud may be permissible or even mandatory. See, e.g., N.J.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1998), available at http://www.njlawnet.com/nj-rpc/
rpc 1-6.htrnl (last visited Nov. I, 2002).
149. See CAL. EVID. CODE ANN. § 1119 (West Supp. 2000); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-22307 (2000); TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
ISO. See Federal Arbitration Act § 10, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000); see also In Re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 148 F.3d 487, 492-93 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the argument that discovery of
confidential mediation records in a federal agency proceeding investigating fraud is barred);
Olam v. Congo Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1121, 1124-25 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(concluding that a mediator could be called to testify under the Federal Rules of Evidence in
a challenge to a mediation agreement in federal court where the enforcement of the contract and
confidentiality issues were a question of state law).
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volatility of this area. 151 The Ethics 2000 Commission recommended,
consistent with the treatment of these issues in the Restatement (Third) ofthe
Law Governing Lawyers, 152 that lawyers be permitted to disclose confidential
client infonnation to prevent, rectify, or mitigate substantial financial loss or
fraud; however, the ABA's House of Delegates rejected the recommendation.
Nonetheless, recent scandals revealing corporate earnings and audit fraud
have resulted in the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,153 which
requires the SEC to adopt professional conduct rules for lawyers practicing
before it and requires lawyers to reveal securities violations and other
corporate misconduct to corporate officials and board members. 154 Thus, this
new federal law will preempt state laws and state ethics rules on
confidentiality in this context, and it will raise interesting questions about the
role of mediators and arbitrators working on corporate matters. Revelation of
a confidential fact from a mediation or arbitration proceeding is one of the few
clear acts of malfeasance that can result in a successful malpractice action
against a third-party neutral. ISS Therefore, with possible conflicting laws and
duties to disclose, the area of confidentiality is fraught with difficulty.156
E. Conflicts ofInterest: Neutrality, Impartiality, and Lack ofBias
Perhaps the most significant issue in debates about ethics in disputeresolution is the conflict of interest issue, which includes the types of
disclosures that mediators and arbitrators should make about past, present, and
future relationships with parties, lawyers, and witnesses to a disputeresolution proceeding. Another issue is whether a "conflict" should foreclose
a third-party neutral's partner from undertaking subsequent representation of
a party. Rule 1.12 of the proposed Model Rules adopted a permissible
screening rule that permits an arbitrator or mediator's partners to engage in
representation of parties in a mediation or arbitration 157 as long as appropriate
screening has taken place according to Rule 1.0(k). Rule 1.12 is likely to
remain controversial as it permits the law partners ofmediators and arbitrators

lSI. See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
152. See RESTATEMENT (1HIRD) OF THE LAW GoVERNING LAWYERS § 67 (2000).
153. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 784 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of
II U.S.C.A., 18 U.S.C.A., 28 U.S.C.A., and 29 U.S.C.A.).
154. See Cahill, Corporate Fraud Law, supra note 12, at'll I.
ISS. See SARAH COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POllCY & PRACTICE 11-20 (2001).
156. Mediators, in particular, often discuss the complexity ofthe civil "Miranda" warnings
they must give parties in mediation. These warnings explain what is confidential and what
might not be confidential. They must also explain that just because something is "confidential"
in a mediation proceeding does not mean it is non-discoverable information in litigation or
another legal proceeding. My mediation retainer agreement now runs about ten single-spaced
pages in length and contains explanations and mutual covenants arnong the mediator, the
parties, and the lawyers.
157. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'LCONDUCT R. 1.12(c)(I) (2002).
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to represent parties to a mediation or arbitration, 158 which could cast doubt on
the neutrality and impartiality of the third party neutral (due to interests in
future business with "satisfied" customers), and which could even allow the
mediatior or arbitrator to represent the parties in the same matter upon
receiving the consent of all parties, a step beyond that permitted by most
mediators' understanding of what is permissible (never to undertake
representation in the same matter). Furthermore, as I have argued
elsewhere,ls9 the definitions of conflicts of interest in the proposed Model
Rules do not elaborate on the particular conflicts that may occur in disputeresolution, such as possible interests in future business as a mediator,
arbitrator, or trainer of a client and whether past representation of a client
resulted in the selection of a particular mediator or "neutral" arbitrator.
Beyond conflicts of interest, more stringent disclosure requirements now
imposed by some states, such as California's Ethics Standards for
Arbitrators, 160 require arbitrators to disclose past, present, or future financial,
legal, economic, and personal relationships with all parties, witnesses, and
lawyers to an arbitration and to include such relationships with their law and
personal (including domestic) partners as well. Such strong disclosure
requirements are intended to expose the possibility that certain arbitrators are
"repeat players" with particular clients and to expose the existence of regular
business to more "one shot" litigants in the arbitration system. So far, no
mediation rules require such extensive disclosure of possible conflicts of
interest, and indeed, most mediator ethics codes define "conflicts" quite
generically and provide minimal guidance. Tennessee's proposed Rule 2.4 for
the Lawyer as Dispute Resolution Neutral, for example, states that "a lawyer
may serve as a dispute resolution neutral" when
the lawyer reasonably believes he or she can be impartial as between the
parties; '" [and] the lawyer's service as a dispute resolution neutral in the
matter will not be adversely affected by the representation of clients with
interests directly adverse to any of the parties to the dispute, by the lawyer's

158. See id. R. 1.12.
159. See sources cited supra note 114.
160. See CAL. ClV. PROC. CODE § 1281.85 (West Supp. 2002); see also Caroline E. Mayer,
Arbitration Standards Challenged, WASH. POST, July 30, 2002, at EI (stating that U[t]he
securities industry is pushing the state of Cali fomi a to exempt arbitrators that handle disputes
against stock brokerages from new arbitration ethics standards that require more disclosure of
conflicts of interests"). The National Association of Securities Dealers filed a complaint
challenging the application of such state standards to its arbitration program for securities
disputes and arguing that it is a self-regulating organization that is governed by the Securities
and Exchange Commission under federal regulatory authority. See Complaint, NASD Dispute
Resolution, Inc. v. Judicial Council of CaL, 232 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (No. C-023486-SC), available at http://www.nasdadr.comlpdf-textl072202_ca_cornplaint.pdf(lastvisited
Nov. 1, 2002).
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responsibilities to a client or third person, or by the lawyer's own interests; 161
... [and] the lawyer consults with each of the parties, or their lawyers, about
any interests of the lawyer, the lawyer's clients, the clients of other lawyers
with whom the lawyer is associated in a firm, or third persons that may
materially affect the lawyer's impartiality in the matter .... 162

Tennessee's proposed Rule 2.4 imposes a "consultation" requirement but does
not define what might constitute a disqualifying conflict of interest. Contrast
this to the treatment in proposed Rule 4.5.4 of the CPR-Georgetown
Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR, which specifies conflicts that
automatically disqualify lawyers, conflicts to which parties may consent, and
conflicts where screening permits some but not all of the law partners of a
lawyer with a conflict of interest to work for parties to particular disputeresolution fora in different or substantially related matters. 163
To the extent that not only the parties to a dispute-resolution event, but the
general public who may watch lawyers repeatedly working for the same client
or switching roles from mediator (neutral) to representative, the old concerns
of "appearance of impropriety"l64 may have implications for the legitimacy of
dispute-resolution fora. While "disclose and party consent" has become one
practical approach to conflicts of interest, the conflicts of interest standards
are further complicated by post-award challenges to arbitration for "evident
partiality"16S or for failure to investigate possible conflicts. l66 In mediation,
such challenges arise with analogies to the conflict rules of past, present, and
future representation ofparties in substantially related matters. 167 At stake are
issues about access to confidential information, the loss of perceived or actual
neutrality, the potential bias in the hope for future business from satisfied
repeat players, and the perception of disloyalty or "role conflicts" when
161. Query whether this is a subjective or objective standard.
162. TENN. RULES OF PROF'LCONDUCT R. 2.4(b)(3), (5) & (7) (effective Mar. 1, 2003).
163. CPR-Georgetown Proposed Rule 4.5, supra note 63.
164. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONsmlLlTY Canon 9 (1977).
165. See Federal Arbitration Act § 10, 9 U.S.c. § 10(a)(2) (2000). Commonwealth
Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968), is the leading United States
Supreme Court case on what standards of conflicts of interest should be applied to arbitrators,
such as a judicial standard or a separate standard for "men of affairs." [d. at 150 (White, J.,
concurring).
166. See, e.g., AI-Harbi v. Citibank, 85 F.3d 680, 682-83 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (concluding that
arbitrator Kenneth Feinberg did not have a duty to investigate his former law firm's prior
representation of one of the parties to the arbitration).
167. See, e.g., PolySoftware Int'l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1491-93 (D. Utah 1995)
(stating that the client sought the disqualification of his adversaries' lawyer as a representative
because the lawyer previously served as mediator in a substantially related matter and had
access to confidential information about both parties to the litigation); Cho v. Super. Ct., 45 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 863, 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that disqualification of an "individual
attorney and his or her firm is required where the attorney has been privy to confidences of a
litigant while acting as a neutral arbitrator").
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lawyers from the same firm serve as neutral dispute resolvers and advocates
for the same parties, and worse still, in the same matter. 168 The conflicts of
interest area makes law before, during, and after dispute-resolution hearings
occur and the continuing vagueness in most ethical codes, including the newly
proposed Model Rules, promises to foster litigation at all of these points in
time.
F. Candor

The obligations of candor that lawyers who serve as representatives,
mediators, and arbitrators owe one another in dispute-resolution proceedings
is also problematic. Under the proposed treatment ofthe Model Rules and the
treatment in the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers,'69 only
binding arbitrations are treated as "tribunals" under the applicable rules
requiring the full duty of candor to the tribunal to report adverse controlling
authority to the third-party neutral or arbitration pane1.170 All non-binding
arbitrations and mediations are treated as if they were negotiations without the
presence of third-party neutrals. However, Rule 4.1 prohibits any
misstatement ofa "material fact or law"171 in this context. In mediations and
non-binding arbitrations there are no obligations to volunteer information or
to correct misinformation by other parties or lawyers in the proceedings unless
the duty is imposed by other law, such as state fraud law or rules of civil
procedure. Mediation, perhaps even more than litigation, relies on candid
statements of the parties regarding their needs, interests, and objectives. It
seems particularly odd, therefore, that the comments to Rule 4.1, which permit
certain forms of "deception"l72 in negotiation, would be permitted in
mediation. While some are concerned that lawyers are not forced to be more
"candid" with mediators than they would be with other lawyers in dyadic
negotiations, a failure to specify more rigorous standards of honesty, as well
as requirements for disclosure of facts, interests, and laws can particularly
harm dispute-resolution and consensus-building efforts. Consequently, many
third-party neutrals feel the need to contract for greater obligations of
disclosure and honesty than is currently required in law or ethics codes.

168. Because of the concern about actual and perceived conflicts and "role switching,"
many third-party neutrals have left their law firms to form specialized dispute-resolution firms.
For examples, see the practices of such leading mediators as Kenneth Feinberg and John
Bickerman (both formerly of Kaye Scholer in Washington, D.C.), John Upchurch in Florida, .
and Bruce Meyerson in Arizona (formerly with Steptoe & Johnson in Phoenix).
169. See supra text accompanying note 61.
170. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(m) (2002).
171. [d. R. 4.1.
172. These forms include "puffing" about the value of a bargained-for item, parties'
settlement preferences, and whether or not the negotiator is working for a particular principal.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 emt. [2].
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G. Costs and Fees
While much of the debate about fees and costs in the deliberations of the
Ethics 2000 Commission revolved around the desirability of written contracts
for lawyer fees, this issue has not figured as heavily in the mediation and
arbitration area, perhaps because so much ADR is contractually based with
fees specified or because these activities occur in court settings where fees are
specified or disallowed. A more critical issue in the dispute-resolution field
is the controversy surrounding the use of particular forms of fees, such as fees
contingent on settlement or "bonuses." Many professionals in the field
believe that such contingent fees should never be used to give third-party
neutrals a "stake" in the settlement or resolution of a matter; however, others
suggest that making fees contingent on success of the proceeding allows
reluctant parties to participate without incurring additional pre-litigation fees
and costs. Ethical issues also arise when one party bears all the costs and fees
because the third-party neutral may favor the paying party in hopes of
receiving future business. 173 However, some courts believe that placing all of
the costs on the wealthier party, such as an employer, enables poorer parties
to participate. 174 Because so much of ADR is private, transparency and
monitoring of particular cost and fee issues may be particularly difficult.

H Contexts
The increased use of the various forms ofdispute resolution in many areas
has caused some to a call for ethics regulation in particular contexts according
to subject matter l7S and according to whether the dispute-resolution

173. See Hass v. County of San Bernadino, 45 P.3d 280, 291-93 (2002) (reversing an
administrative hearing decision where the government paid the hearing officer who was likely
to get future business from the government).
174. See, e.g., Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(stating that the employer should pay all ofthe arbitrator's fees and expenses for claimants in
mandatory employment arbitration).
175. These subject areas range from employment, environmental, family, consumer, and
health disputes, to securities and mass tort class actions, and complex international commercial
disputes and transactions, which involve both individuals and multiple corporate or institutional
entities. There has already been a great deal of activity in the effort to draft ethical standards
for specific subject-matter disputes. See, e.g., MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMll.Y&
DIVORCE MEDIATION (Am. Bar Ass'n 2001), available at http://www.abanet.org/ftp/pub/
family/fccrdraft.doc; DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER
DISPUTES (Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Nat'l Consumer Disputes Advisory Comm. 1998), available
at http://www.adr.org; A DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR RESOLUTION OF HEALTH CARE DISPUTES
(Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Am. Bar Ass'n, Am. Med. Ass'n Comm'n on Health Care Dispute
Resolution 1998), available at http://www.adr.org; CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (Am. Arbitration Ass'n & Am. Bar Ass'n 1977), available at
http://www.adr.org;RULESOFETHICSFORINT·LARBITRATORS(Int.IBarAss·n 1986); see also
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proceeding is being conducted in private or within the courts 176 or
governmental agencies. 177
Whether the different kinds of
processes-arbitration, mediation, and consensus building-have their own
"moralities"-a claim made famously and rigorously by the jurisprude Lon
Fuller many years ago l7S_requiring their own functional logic and ethics is
also a lively and continuing debate among those who promulgate ethical
rules. 179
I Compliance, Enforcement, Liability, and Immunity

State disciplinary bodies enforce legal ethical codes. Formed as either
independent state agencies or divisions of the state supreme court, state
disciplinary bodies are responsible for. regulating the state's legal
profession. ISO Professional associations that promulgate specialized ethical

Complaint, NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. v. Judicial Council of Cal., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1055
(N.D. Cal. 2002) (No. C-02346-56), available at http://www.nasdadr.comlpdftextl072202_ca_complaint. pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2002) (arguing that regulation ofNASD' s
arbitrators in security broker disputes should be left to "self-regulating organizations," which
are regulated by federal agencies); Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlement ofMass Torts,
supra note 11, at 1188 (suggesting that different ethical rules should apply to the settlements
of mass tort claims).
176. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. R. 1-1 (2002) (stating that the rules apply to ADR proceedings
"in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California"); ROBERT J. NIEMIC
ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, GUIDE TO JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN ADR (2001)
(offering methods that federal courts may follow in selecting, referring, and managing cases in
ADR), available at www.fjc.gov; REPORT OF THE ADR TASK FORCE OF THE COURT ADMIN. &
CASEMGMT. COMM., GUIDELINES FOR ENSURING FAIR AND EFFECTIVE COURT-ANNEXED ADR:
ATTRIBUTES OF A WEll-FUNCTIONING ADR PROGRAM AND ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR ADR
NEUTRALS (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1997), reprinted in CIVll. LmGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL
app. B, at 395 (U.S. Judicial Conference 200 1), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/civillitig/
civillitig04.pdf.
177. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-84 (2000) (providing governing rules for ADR in the
context of governmental agencies).
178. See LoN FUlLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LoN L.
FUUER (Kenneth 1. Winston ed., rev. ed. 2001).
179. See generally Catherine Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a
Code 0/Conduct for International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 341 (2001)( observing that
"[i]nternational arbitration dwells in an ethical no-man's land" and seeking to "develop a
methodology for prescribing the normative content of a code of ethics for international
arbitration"). See also Catherine Rogers, Context and Institutional Structure in Attorney
Regulation: Developing an Enforcement Regime/or International Arbitration, STAN. J. OF
INT'L L. (forthcoming 2002) (suggesting that ethics rules in dispute resolution must "fit" the
particular functions performed and may vary with the context in which the dispute resolution
process occurs).
180. See Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms, 77 CORNELL L. REv. I, 3
(1991 ).

HeinOnline -- 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 97 2002-2003

98

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 70:63

codes often have ethics committees to perform oversight or to issue advisory
opinions; however, without licensing for ADRprofessionals, formal sanctions
hardly exist for "unethical" conduct by third-party neutrals. 181 Some
professional organizations will strike the names of "censured" professionals
from their rosters as a means of discipline; 182 however, there is a question
regarding whether a form of due process must be provided to a mediator,
arbitrator, or neutral before his or her name is stricken from court-maintained
rolls. A few states have developed formal bodies of disciplinary authority for
mediators and arbitrators, 183 particularly for those professionals who are listed
on court or government rosters. At the intemationallevel, organizations that
sponsor and administer international commercial arbitration adjudicate
"challenge" claims against arbitrators suspected of having conflicts of interest
or who commit misconduct, and poSt-hoc challenges to arbitral awards may
also involve some post-hoc judicial rulings on the appropriateness of arbitrator
conduct. 184 Relatively few malpractice claims are filed against both
mediators l8S and arbitrators l86 in large part because a judicial policy
supporting alternative dispute resolution has granted either absolute or "quasijudicial" immunity to mediators (at least in the court setting) and arbitrators
(even in private settings who are seen to be performing adjudicative
services)187 through both case law and statutory grants of immunity. 188

181. See Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic ofProcess, 64 N. Y. U. L. REv.
493,545 (1989) (suggesting that the most effective form of "discipline" for unethical behavior
in negotiation is the lawyer's reputation in the market); CPR-Georgetown Comm'n on Ethics
& Standards of Practice in ADR, Principles for ADR Provider Organizations pmbl., at 5 (2002)
[hereinafter CPR-Georgetown Principles] (stating that "[i]n addition to establishing a
benchmark for responsible practice," the CPR-Georgetown Commission aims to "enhance
understanding of the ADR field's special responsibilities, as justice providers, to provide fair,
impartial and quality process").
182. See Reuben, supra note 138, at 1013.
183. See FLA. STAT. § 44.201 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 10.900 (West Supp. 2002); see
also Robert B. Moberly, Ethical Standards for Court-Appointed Mediators and Florida's
Mandatory Mediation Experiment, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 701,719 (1994) (stating that "[t]o
the author's knowledge, Florida is the first state to adopt a procedure to enforce mediator
standards of conduct"); FLA. DISPUTE RESOLUTION CrR., MEDIATOR QUALIFICATIONS BOARD
UPDATE (1996), available at http://www.flcourts.orgloscaldivisionsladrlbrochure.html.
184. See Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration, supra note 64, at 963-66,970-74.
185. But see, e.g., Lange v. Marshall, 622 S.W.2d 237, 237-39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)
(reversing a $74,000 jury verdict against a lawyer who served as a mediator for the husband and
wife who were divorcing).
186. But see, e.g., Baar v. Tigerman, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834, 835 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)
(declining "to grant quasi-judicial immunity to an arbitrator who breached his contract to render
a timely award").
187. Id. at 836-37 (stating that courts "have long recognized immunity to protect arbitrators
from civil liability for actions taken in the arbitrator's quasi-judicial capacity").
188. See CAL. CIY. PROC. CODE § 1297.432 (West Supp. 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
44.201(6) (West 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.1(j) (2001); see a/so SARAH COlE ET AL.,
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J. Corporate, Organizational, and Provider Liability

Perhaps because there is so little "quality control" of individual
practitioners of dispute-resolution, demand has grown for oversight or
regulation of dispute-resolution service providers. In response to the ongoing
objections to mandatory arbitration in employment, consumer, and health care
disputes, a variety of organizations have engaged in voluntary self-regulation
by adopting "due process protocols." Such protocols provide basic standards
to ensure fairness in the conduct of mediation and arbitration proceedings that
usually originate from contractual dispute-resolution clauses. 189
Following suggestions in legal commentary that entities and organizations
should be held responsible for their actions in providing legal services,19O the
CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR promulgated
the Principles for ADR Provider Organizations ("Principles"), the first ever
set of standards for ADR service provider organizations. These standards are
designed to "offer a framework for responsible practice by entities that
promise ADR service"191; they suggest "best practices" and "baseline"
measures for provider organizations in the provision of arbitration, mediation
and other forms of ADR services. Unless adopted by state legislatures or
appropriate state governmental entities,I92 these standards do not have the

MEDIATION: LAW, POUCY AND PRACTICE ch. II (2001) (reviewing state law (common and
statutory) on immunity and malpractice standards in mediation). Compare Joseph B. Stulberg,
Mediator Immunity, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. REsoL. 85, 85 (1986) (arguing in favor of mediator
immunity), with Amanda K. Esquibel, The Case ofthe Conflicted Mediator: An Argument for
Liability and Against Immunity, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 131, 134 (1999) (arguing against mediator
immunity). The New Jersey Supreme Court has declined to permit mediator immunity due to
the absence of quality control protections. See N.J. Sup. Ct., Task Force Report on
Complementary Dispute Resolution, 124 N.J. L.J. 90 (1990).
189. See,e.g.,DUEPROCESSPROTOCOLFORMEDIATIONANDARBITRATIONOFSTATUTORY
DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (Am. Bar Ass'n 1995), available
at http://www.bna.com; A DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR RESOLUTION OF HEALTH CARE
DISPUTES (Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Am. Bar Ass'n, Am. Med. Ass'n Comm'n on Health Care
Dispute Resolution 1998), available at http://www.adr.org; DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR
MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER DISPUTES (Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Nat'l
Consumer Disputes AdvisoryComm. 1998), available at http://www.adr.org; JAMSPOUCYON
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION MlNIMuM STANDARDS OFPROCEDURALF AIRNESS (2002), available
at http://www.jarnsadr.comlemployrnentArb_min_stds.asp.
190. See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 180, at 5-4 (arguing that "[a]s law firms grow, the
potential harm they can inflict on clients, third parties, and the legal process grows as well").
191. CPR-Georgetown Principles, supra note 181, pmbJ., at 5.
192. See, e.g., CHARLES POU, JR., DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVS., MEDIATOR QUAUTY
ASSURANCE: A REPORTTO THE MD. MEDIATOR QUALITY AsSURANCE OVERSIGHTCoMM. (Feb.
2002), available at http://www.acresolution.org; see also UNITED STATES POSTAL SERV.,
MINIMUM CRITERIA FOR MEDIATORS OF POSTAL SERVICE DISPUTES, CERTIFICATION FOR
REDRESS MEDIATORS, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR POSTAL SERVICE MEDIATIONS, available
at http://www.usps.comlcpimlftp/pubsipubI02.html.
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force of law. They have, however, become a discussion document for
assessing quality in state dispute-resolution programs. 193 The Principles state
that organizations that refer, suggest, train, or provide individual dispute
resolution services have responsibilities to ensure the quality and
competence 194 of individuals that appear on their lists or rosters, 19S "to provide
clear, accurate and understandable information" about the services
provided,196 to take "reasonable steps" to make services available to "lowincome parties[,]"197 to disclose all appropriate conflicts of interest, 198 to make
available a grievance or complaint mechanism for the services offered,199 to
require neutrals to adhere to "reputable internal or external" ethics codes,2°O
to avoid making "false or misleading" statements about services provided/o 1
and to take appropriate steps to ensure that services that are provided are done
so in a "fundamentally fair" and "impartial manner."202 Principle I also
recognizes that the obligations under these standards may vary with the degree
of knowledge and sophistication on the part of parties that actively and
thoroughly screen and select particular neutrals. 203 Although William Slate,
the President of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), served on the
CPR-Georgetown Commission, his organization did not "fully endorse" the
Principles; instead, the AAA adopted its own set of principles204 due to a
concern that the CPR-Georgetown Principles would become legally
enforceable standards for potential organizational liability.
Given the efforts of ADR organizations such as the AAA, the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (''NASD''), and the Judicial Arbitration
and Mediation Services, Inc. ("JAMS") to self-regulate by adopting their own
internal organizational ethical and practice standards,20s it remains to be seen
whether courts or other bodies will hold provider organizations206 or the

193. See Conference ofSoc'yofProfls in Dispute Resolution, Albuquerque, N.M. (Sept.
2000), available at http://www.acresolution.org.
194. CPR-Georgetown Principles, supra note 181, cmt., at 6.
195. [d. Principle I, at 7.
196. [d. Principle II, at 9.
197. [d. Principle IV, at 10.
198. [d. Principle V, at 10.
199. [d. Principle VI, at 12.
200. [d. Principle VII, at 12.
201. [d. Principle VIII, at 13.
202. [d. Principle III, at 10.
203. [d. Principle I(b), at 7.
204. See Arbitration, The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, available
at httpll:www.adr.org.
205. See CPR-Georgetown Principles, supra note 181, pmbl., at 5.
206. Some organizations, such as the Academy of Civil Trial Mediators and the National
Academy of Arbitrators have elected members based on experience and reputation in the field.
It remains to be seen whether conferring "honorific" status wiII insure any more quality than
less exclusive organizational providers. Government agencies are also providing rosters of
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individuals on their rosters to their self-imposed standards of quality,
competence, and liability.207
K. Complaints and Grievances

As ethicists, consumers, and professionals advocate for more official
regulation of the provision of private and public dispute resolution services,
many have suggested that users of dispute-resolution services should have
formal opportunities to raise questions and grievances about the process,
especially where provider organizations (as well as courts and government
agencies) select, list, train, and refer the third-party neutrals assigned. Many
formal ADR organizations have grievance committees or ethics committees,
which range from the Arbitration Court of the International Chamber of
Commerce to an ad hoc ethics committee at CPR, to rule on challenges
regarding conflicts of interest, misconduct, or other alleged ethical
"violations." There are as yet, however, no formal requirements that such
organizations provide procedures for enforcing even their own rules. The
CPR-Georgetown Principles suggest that provider organizations "should
provide mechanisms for addressing grievances about the Organization, and its
administration or the neutral services offered, and should disclose the nature
and availability of the mechanisms to the parties . . . .,,208 Courts, to some
extent, have begun scrutinizing the work of particular providers,209 especially
when a single provider is used throughout a particular industry. The existence
of a formal complaint and grievance procedure is likely to render that provider
more acceptable to regulators.
L. Conflict ofLaws

The above discussion should make clear that there are now many sources
of rules, statutes, standards, and regulations for ethical and good practices in

neutrals, who are usually "certified" after acquiring specified amounts of experience, otherwise
known as "flying time."
207. One test was the litigation between the NASD and the California Judicial Council,
which attempted to regulate ethical standards for all arbitrators in California. See Complaint,
NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. v. Judicial Council of Cal. (N.D. Cal. 2002) (No. C-02-3486sq, available at http://www.nasdadr.comlpdf-textl072202_ca_complaint.pdf(last visited Nov.
1,2002). Rather than deciding the merits of the case, however, the district court dismissed the
case on Eleventh Amendment state immunity grounds. See id.
208. CPR-Georgetown Principles, supra note 181, Principle VI, at 12. Principle VI also
suggests that the organization provide a "fair and impartial process for the affected neutral or
other individual against whom a grievance has been made." [d.
209. See, e.g., Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, 938 P.2d 903, 908 (Cal. 1997)
(concluding, in part, "that there is indeed evidence to support the trial court's initial findings
that Kaiser engaged in fraudulent conduct justifYing a denial of its petition to compel
arbitration ").
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the provision of dispute-resolution and consensus-building services. Such
sources include federal statutes, regulations, and case law, as well as state
substantive and ethical regulation and private rules of associations. At the
international level, private associations, such as the ICC, the London Court of
International Arbitration, the AAA, and courts, which are asked to enforce or
vacate arbitral awards, will rule on the ethics and conduct of third-party
neutrals. In the United States, where there is currently a great deal of
advocacy in both courts and legislatures about the unfairness of mandatory
contractual dispute resolution (particularly arbitration), proposals for new
layers of regulation are pending at every level of governmental action.
Finding the relevant ethical rule or statutory standard in a private or public
dispute-resolution proceeding, negotiated rule-making, or consensus-building
process is difficult, but once found, duties may conflict with confidentiality
protections in mediation/tO as in the case of governmental transparency and
public infonnation policies, and in the case offederal-state conflicts oflaws,
rules, and policies. For example, the new federal corporate fraud act, which
requires lawyers to "whistleblow" on their clients' economic fraud, may
conflict with and may thus preempt state ethics rules that protect client
confidentiality .
Mediators, arbitrators, and facilitators in courts and governmental
administrative proceedings may be subject to governmental rules, state ethics
codes, the ethical rules of professional associations or provider associations
of which they are members, and the contractual or retainer provisions signed
by the parties to a particular proceeding. Thus, dispute resolvers and
facilitators operate in public and private settings with a variety of parties who
are not "clients" in the representational sense but who are "clients" of the
dispute-resolution process and may be owed different sets of ethical and
practice protections. There have been efforts to promulgate more uniform
rules, as in the case of confidentiality rules in the Uniform Mediation Act and
joint action rules on the part of multiple organizations2tt to create some

210. See In reGrand Jury Subpoena, 148 F.3d 487, 491-92 (5th Cir. 1998); Cincinnati Gas
& Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 904 (6th Cir. 1988); Bank of Am. Nat'1 Trust
& Says. Ass'n. v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d. 339, 346 (3d Cir. 1986); Olam v.
Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1121-23 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Neary v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 123 (Cal. 1992); see also News-Press Publ'g Co. v. Lee County,
570 So.2d 1325, 1327 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (ruling on conflicts between state "sunshine
laws" for state administrative agency deliberations and the conflicting policy of confidentiality
in mediation); Kate Marquess, South Carolina Moves Toward Squelching Secrecy: Sealed
Settlements Could Become a Thing of the Past, I A.B.A. J. EREPORT, Aug. 9, 2002, ,. 1,
available at WL 30 ABAJEREP 6 (stating that "South Carolina's federal courts may become
the first in the nation to ban sealed settlements"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Public Access to
Private Settlements: Conflicting Legal Policies, 11 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST OF LITIG. 85
(1993) (reviewing the conflicting policies in protecting the privacy of legal settlements and the
"public interest").
211. Examples include the AAAIABAISPIDR Joint Standards of Conduct for Mediators
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consensually arrived at standards of conduct and best practices; however,
courts and legislatures212 do not always defer to such efforts.213
For those who argue that dispute-resolution and consensus-building
processes are ultimately voluntary, consensual, and often private, the ultimate
jurisprudential challenges of the moment involve the appropriate level of
public regulation and the relation of private self-regulation to more public
processes, such as court mediation and administrative reg-neg, and to the wide
variety of hybrid processes, such as when a court-annexed mediation is
conducted in a private law office. To the extent that we are becoming aware
of the many ethical and practice issues implicated in "the more conventional"
and legally based forms of dispute resolution, such as arbitration and
mediation, we are just beginning to recognize and consider some of the more
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more democratic, forms of deliberation in consensus-building and publicpolicy fora to which I now tum.

M. Consensus Building
Our hopes for using democratic deliberative fora to deal with complex
social, legal, and economic policy issues and disputes at all levels of human
interaction, such as the local, state, national, and international levels, raise
additional ethical concerns for the neutral facilitators of these processes as
well as for the participating parties. At the outset, the assumption of these
processes is that many stakeholders must be identified and invited in by
someone, usually the "convener" ofthe process, who may serve as a "host,"
a "leader," or a consulting "facilitator." Ensuring that a consensus-building
process is legitimate by inviting all appropriate stakeholders is widely
regarded as the key to the success of such processes and distinguishes such a
deliberative democratic process from more conventional lawsuits or
transactional matters. Once many stakeholders are invited in, however,
complicated issues of process management and decision rules will arise.
Furthermore, the biggest challenge for neutral facilitators involves how to
handle extremists, "hold-outs," or others who seek to prevent agreements from
occurring for legitimate and illegitimate purposes.
and the Due Process Protocols mentioned in this Article. See sources cited supra notes 136 and
175.
212. See CAL. CIY. PROC. CODE § 1281.85 (West 2002).
213. Courts ruling on challenges to arbitral awards, in particular, have often refused to
adhere to privately adopted ethical standards when deciding whether an arbitrator demonstrated
"evident partiality" in order to vacate an arbitral award under the Federal Arbitration Act. See,
e.g., Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that the
American Arbitration Association's "Commercial Arbitration Rules and Code of Ethics for
Arbitrators ... do not have the force of law''); see also Delta Mine Holding Co. v. AFC Coal
Props., Inc., 280 F.3d 815, 820 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that "the district court erred in placing
primary emphasis on whether [the] party arbitrator ... violated ... the Code of Ethics").
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Consensus-seeking facilitators always face ethical issues regarding
transparency, privacy, and secrecy in deliberations214 where private caucuses
allow side deals and trades without public posturing but which ultimately
must be disclosed to all interested parties and to the public to assure
acceptability. Facilitators or managers of these complex processes must also
deal with power imbalances between parties, especially where many parties
do not have legal or other types of representation or substantive expertise.21S
In a decisional process that is designed to maximize both participation and
substantive results (meaning inducement of and satisfaction of the needs and
interests of the greatest number of participants), one way to approach power
imbalances is to provide preliminary process training to all participants. Thus,
consensus-building professionals, like Lawrence Susskind of the Consensus
Building Institute and Chris Carlson of the Policy Consensus Institute, provide
negotiation training to participants before beginning a policy-setting
consensus-building event. This training is called "capacity building," which
may empower participants to learn process skills that will transcend
participation in a particular event. In the environmental area,216 for example,
former Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt encouraged the use of the
Habitat Conservation Plan processes to encourage the development oflargearea ecosystem conservation and development plans to avoid the "zero-sum"
gridlock involved in enforcing the Endangered Species Act. Secretary Babbitt
did this by encouraging negotiated plans for species preservation, resource
management, scientific monitoring, and goal-setting among a diverse group
of governmental, environmental, and developer actors across the nation.217

214. See ELSTER, ALcHEMIES OF THE MIND, supra note 72, at 250-51 (discussing different
constitutional substantive arrangements that he attributes to differences in public versus private
constitutional deliberations in America and France in the eighteenth century).
215. For the debates about power imbalances in dyadic mediation, see generally Trina
Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991)
(discussing the application of mandatory mediation to family law and concluding that
"mandatory mediation provides neither a more just nor a more humane alternative to the
adversarial system of adjudication of custody, and, therefore, does not fulfill its promises").
Power imbalances in deliberative democracy experiments have emerged as a key point of
critique. See, e.g., Young, supra note 77; see also Lawrence Susskind, Environmental
Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REv. 1, 15 (1981) ("Mediators may ...
have to build the basic negotiating capabilities of one or more of the parties to ensure more
equal bargaining relationships.").
216. For one ofthe most cited examples ofthe use of consensus building for environmental
problem-solving, see JOSH EAGLE, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW AND POllCY PROGRAM, PUBUC PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL FOREST
MANAGEMENT: THE SIERRA NEVADA FRAMEWORK FOR CONSERVAnON AND COllABORATION
AND THE QUINCY LmRARY GROUP (SLS Case No.98-026 1998) (developing models for public
participation in forest management with local, regional, and national interests).
217. See Bruce Babbitt, ADR Concepts: Reshaping the Way Natural Resources Decisions
are Made, in INTO THE 21 ST CENTURY: THOUGHT PIECES ON LAWYERING, PROBLEM SOLVING
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With repeated uses of these processes, the hope and theory is that capacity for
participation will be enhanced by education and increased experience.218
The use of public-policy fora and consensus-building processes is
sufficiently new and complex in its attempt to provide real democratic
participation opportunities and demonstrate its effectiveness that it may be too
early to lay down definitive ethical standards and norms. Furthermore,
because the kind of professionals capable of leading, facilitating, and
managing such processes are sufficiently diverse,219 it is probably unwise to
establish ethical standards within a particular discipline, such as law.
Nevertheless, articulating aspirational standards and "best practices," which
attempt to specify widely shared, if not universal, norms,220 is a useful way to
begin a debate and discussion about the best and most effective and fairest
ways to conduct these processes. The foiiowing vaiues can be said to inform
the work of many who serve as professional facilitators of public participation
and deliberative processes and may serve as a basis for an ethics code for this
portion of the field. 221

ANDADR 13 (CPR Inst. for Dispute Resolution 2001); Fung & Wright, supra note 75.
218. Of course, this can work both ways. Repeat player developers, like Wal-Mart, learn
how to "play" communities against each other in what they offer or demand in terms of tax
relief, jobs promised, and community services supported.
219. At least one multi-disciplinary professional association, the International Association
for Public Participation, has already emerged in this field. See International Association for
Public Participation, About IAP2, at http://www.iap2.org/boardlinklaboutiap2.html (last visited
Nov. 4, 2002). "IAP2 is primarily concerned with process, rather than specific positions on
issues. Indeed, we regard ourselves primarily as facilitators--people who work to make
planning and decision processes more inclusive and transparent." International Association
for Public Participation, IAP2 Home Page News!, at http://www.iap2.org/ (last visited Oct. 3,
2002).
220. For a history ofthe United Nations' negotiation and drafting process ofthe Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, see MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR
ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DEClARAnON OF HUMAN RIGms 71 (200 I), where Eleanor
Roosevelt advocated for a "mora\1y binding ... declaration, rather than a legal1y binding
international agreement."
221. These core values are from my own experience in the field and my efforts to specify
a set of aspirations when I teach and train others for this type of work. For the last few years,
I have been part of an informal group of "senior mediators and facilitators" who meet annua\1y
at the Western Justice Center in Pasadena to share ideas and experiences in the field. The
group has informa\1y worked on developing a "consensus" about the core values of our field.
The issues and values expressed above have not been endorsed by this group or any other with
which I work and are provided for illustrative and discussion purposes only. I would like to
extend a special thanks to Lawrence Susskind who initiated this discussion and began this work.
My statement of "core values" here suggests "principles of practice and ethics" for both
participants and leaders or facilitators of these processes. A more complete statement may also
specify another set of principles for those who, like lawyers, represent parties and participants
in proceedings. Here, I have chosen to treat "participants" as parties and their representatives.
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1. Broad Stakeholder Identification
To the extent possible, all parties and groups with a "stake" or interest, or
those who might otherwise be affected by a decision in a matter, should be
invited to participate or should be represented by those whose individual
interests are reasonably comparable.
2. Opportunity to Participate and Have a Voice
All identified stakeholders, whether direct constituents or in represented
capacities, should have adequate opportunities to be heard and to participate
in proceedings that may result in decisions affecting them. Parties and
stakeholders should be able to choose representatives to represent or express
their interests.
3. Participant Agreement on Process and Ground Rules
Clear rules of procedure and process for participation should be "agreed"
to by the participants. Recognizing that some participants in consensusbuilding events democratically select their own rules while others agree to use
the procedures suggested by expert facilitators, there should be a prior
agreement before deliberations begin regarding how participants will behave.
Where possible, agendas should be set in advance, and procedures for
recording, taking minutes, or information sharing should be developed.
Protocols and rules about publicity, transparency, or confidentiality and secret
or protected deliberations should be specified. Where possible, participants
should agree on enforcement mechanisms for monitoring and adhering to such
process guidelines and procedures. Expectations ofparticipatory norms, such
as attendance, speaking turns, degree of candor, use of experts and scientific
or factual data, and processes for joint fact-fmding, should be specified.
4. Participant Agreement to Decision Rules
Before commencing deliberations and taking actions, participants should
agree on the "rules of decision" to employ in order to specify what constitutes
"consensus." Consensus need not involve unanimity or majority vote but
should specify what participants will consider sufficient for a "decision" or
"action" to be taken or a recommendation to be made to the appropriate
governmental or other action authorities.
5. Participant Recognition of Individual. Mutual, and Joint Gains and
Improvements
ParticiDants should seek. where DOssible, to recognize individual, mutual,
and joint gains and improvements. The purposes of consensus building
processes are not to replicate other forms of binary "zero-sum" decision-
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making, but to seek ways to satisfy the needs, interests, and objectives of all
the participants. Such participation processes seek to achieve Pareto-optimal
and creative outcomes; in other words, the process seeks to maximize joint
gain without unnecessarily causing harm or unagreed-to losses to any other
participants.
6. Justified Bases for Claims, Arguments, Needs, and Interests
Participants should be able to express justifications for their views,
arguments, needs, and objectives by explaining why particular outcomes or
principles are important. Justifications may include reasons, data, values,
beliefs, and emotions.
7. Fair Hearing and Respect for All Participants
All participants should respectfully listen to and attempt to understand the
perspectives of all other participants. Process and ground rules s~ould specify
the rules of discussion, deliberation, and decision and how participants should
demonstrate respect for differences among participants.
8. Seeking Creative and Tailored Decisions and Solutions
Participants and leaders or facilitators should seek creative and tailored
decisions and solutions to their policy or dispute resolution objectives.
Public-policy deliberation and consensus-building fora are designed to
increase the possibility of fmding tailored solutions to particular problems,
conflicts, and disputes, as well as to create new entities or relationships to
handle specific issues. Decisions taken or solutions crafted for particular
problems need not be based on precedent but should offer the opportunity to
develop specific and "localized" solutions. 222
9. Third-Party Neutrals Should be "Clean"
Facilitators. mediators. or other third-party neutrals or intermediaries who
assist and guide such participatory processes should act without bias or
partisanship and should be accountable and acceptable to the participants in

222. Note that in consensus building involving environmental and administrative
regulatory issues, tensions arise between localized "solutions" and the need for more regional,
national, or universal standards. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 68. Proponents of consensus
building suggest that information coordination should be available, whether through formal
governmental processes or more informal information sharing. In administrative regulatory
literature, information coordination has been variously described as benchmarking, standard
monitoring, and innovation sharing. See CHARLEs SABEL ET AL., BEYOND BACKYARD
ENVIRONMENTAUSM 4 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers ed5., 2000).
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the process. Third-party neutrals should disclose past, present, or potential
future relationships and conflicts of interest with the participants or issues,
which may cause the process to be perceived as biased. Where professionals
or process experts are used to facilitate consensus-building processes, they
should be chosen by and be accountable to the participants. Such third-party
neutrals should act without partisanship and bias and should conduct
themselves fairly.223
10. Facilitation of Dialogue
Facilitators. mediators. intermediaries. or other third-party neutrals should
act to effectivelv facilitate dialolZUe. discussion and deliberation. to promote
creative and efficacious oroblem solving. and to otherwise productively and
fairly manage a consensus-seeking process.
11. Enhanced Capacities
Facilitators, mediators, intermediaries, or other third-party neutrals should
enhance the capacities of participants to participate in such processes in the
present and in the future with other parties. Where possible, process experts
should be sure that parties learn how to negotiate, deal with differences and
conflicts, and deliberate and dialogue with each other effectively. Enhanced
capacity should occur not only to maximize effective participation in a
particular event but also to improve and facilitate future dealings with the
same or different parties.
12. Considerations of Practicality
Facilitators. mediators. intermediaries. or other third-partvneutrals should
attemot to ensure that decisions and agreements are implementable and that
contingencies and future processes have been considered. Third-party
neutrals should engage in "reality testing" to ensure decisions taken or
agreements reached are implementable or realizable or that recommendations
for future action may be referred to the appropriate legal or other authorities.

223. Note that my fonnulation above does not demand neutrality because I believe that no
human being is capable of being completely neutral. What is important is to act fairly and
without bias toward the parties and participants. A mediator or facilitator may, in fact, have to
take a non-neutral or punitive action if a party violates a procedure or engages in other
misconduct; however, as long as the procedure is fair, such an action is completely proper and
within the role of the third-party facilitator. See Howard Gadlin & Elizabeth Walsh Pino,
Neutrality: A Guide for the Organizational Ombudsperson, \3 NEGL. J. 17 (1997). An
important controversy among mediators and facilitators involves when and how mediators
should "intervene" to ensure fair outcomes and to protect the "unrepresented" parties. See
Susskind, supra note 215, at 4-6.
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Effective process experts should also assist the parties in developing plans for
contingencies or uncertainties in agreements or decisions and provide for
future deliberative or dispute-resolution processes.
13. Following Decision Rules and the Law
Agreements, decisions, and solutions should be approved according to the
decision rules ofthe participants and consistent with applicable legal or other
contextually based authorities. Agreements should be based on informed
consent, not on coercion. A decision to not reach agreement should be a
legitimate outcome if the conditions for reaching an agreement are not met.
14. Respectful Awareness
Facilitators, mediators, intermediaries, or other third-party neutrals should
be sensitive to the different substantive, institutional, social, and cultural
contexts in which they perform their duties.
15. Avoiding Unjust or Unfair Results 224
A facilitator, mediator, intermediary, or other third-party neutral should
do everything within his or her control to ensure that any agreement reached
or decision taken is not unconscionable,m unfair, unjust, or causes
unnecessary harm to the participants or to any third parties not present during
the process. An effective consensus-building process should at least make the
parties better off than they were before they began, perhaps emerging with
little more than mutual understanding. However, a deliberative process
should not be used to circumvent other legitimate laws or processes or to
deflect harm onto unrepresented parties. Third-party neutrals should not
preside over agreements that are obviously unfair, unjust, unconscionable, or
that will harm the participants or others outside of the process.

***

224. This last statement, or "core value," is "optional" because it is very controversial in
the field of third-party neutrals and would impose a vague, but very demanding, standard of
ethics and behavior.
.
225. This statement tracks the efforts to prohibit lawyers from negotiating and agreeing to
"unconscionable" agreements in legal negotiations, which was originally proposed as Rule 4.3
for the Kutak Commission; however, the proposed rule was soundly defeated. See BRUNET &
CRAVER, supra note 134, at 174-75; Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in
Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REv. 577, 591 (1975) (positing the precept that "[t]he lawyer may not
accept a result that is unconscionably unfair to the other party") (emphasis omitted); James J.
White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. 1. 926 (1980).
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The purpose of the preceding list of "core values" is to express some key
ideas of good practices for both participants and expert "leaders" of
consensus-building procedures. Such processes may be used in many settings,
including public governmental, private individual, organizational, and
international settings. A skilled "neutral" must become aware of and be
respectful of how different settings and environments may require adaptation
and modifications of the general principles.
IV. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR LA WYERS AS CONSENSUS
BUILDERS

As the old Chinese proverb suggests, "we live in interesting times."
Lawyers, as if they didn't have enough to do, now have the opportunity to
expand their functions from traditional roles of advocate to facilitator,
problem-solver, dispute resolver, and "neutral." For those lawyers who
choose such new functions, whether as part of a traditional practice or as a
different practice, there are many rewards and many challenges. For lawyers
who continue to serve as advocates, the challenge will be to incorporate
different paradigms or frameworks of work into the same human being.226 For
lawyers who commit to a full-time practice offacilitation, mediation, dispute
resolution, or consensus building, there will be collaboration and competition
with others in the field who come from different disciplinary backgrounds.
Whether it is possible to generate a core set of values, practices, and
ethics from such a new interdisciplinary field that operates in so many
different substantive environments remains to be seen. Already, some of us
in the "founding generation" of this field lament the entrepreneurial turn that
it appears to be taking. Many American professions, both old and new, face
challenges to their core values and objectives, as demonstrated in the recent
book, Good Work: When Excellence and Ethics Meet.227 Entrepreneurial and
economic pressures, as well as increased demands for immediate success,228

226. After many years of being a trial lawyer and teaching trial advocacy, I abandoned
those roles when I became a more seriously committed mediator and mediation teacher. I found
the roles of trial lawyer and mediator incompatible. See Jonathan Hyman, Trial Advocacy and
Methods a/Negotiation: Can Good Trial Advocates Be Wise Negotiators?, 34 UCLA L. REv.
863,863-64 (1987).
227. HOWARD GARDNER ET AL., GooD WORK: WHEN EXCElLENCE AND Enncs MEET
(2001) (contrasting the declining professional ethics and commitment of journalism to the
"aligned" professionalism of geneticists).
228. A recent effort to use a consensus-building process in the United States Congress
resulted in a bipartisan statement about faith-based government initiatives. The effort was
designed to demonstrate how a controversial issue, such as providing government subsidies for
religious organizations that provide social services, could produce "recommendations" across
party lines. See The Working Group on Human Needs and Faith-Based and Community
Initiatives, Finding Common Ground: 29 Recommendations o/the Working Group on Human
Needs and Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (2002), available at www.working-
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often mute the animating values and goals of those who seek to develop a
truly "alternative" professional framework.
It is not clear whether the promulgation of ethics rules or codifications of
the field facilitate professional identity in a positive waf29 or, in the
alternative, blunt the opportunities for experimentation and cross-disciplinary
collaboration. Ethics rules are often justified in terms ofprotecting the public.
In conflict resolution, standards are necessary to assure consumers of these
processes that what is being offered is fair (especially when compared to
better known and mere conventional legal processes) and conducted by
experienced professionals. Mediators, arbitrators, and facilitators need
guidance in resolving difficult ethical dilemmas that they face.2 30 Lawyers,
who are subject to discipline under the Model Rules for all work performed,
even if it is not "the practice of law," may be harmed by the lack of clarity
regarding their duties and responsibilities when they take on other roles.
Despite the minimalist approach to ADR ethics in the revised Model Rules,
state legislatures have passed full statutory schemes for the use of ADR231 and
have proposed232 amending their ethical codes to better regulate the role of the
lawyer as third-party neutral. Most of this activity focuses on the role of
lawyers as arbitrators, mediators, or neutral evaluators. To the extent that
lawyers now participate in new forms of conflict resolution and legal problem
solving, such as policy formation and consensus building (where I think they
should be especially useful as both "process architects" and as experts on
substantive legal requirements), the ethical terrain is even more unmarked and
unguided. Whether lawyers who do this work should be guided by what little
there is in the interdisciplinary field already, or whether they should take the
lead in suggesting analogues to conventional legal ethical norms and newer
particularized standards of practice is a difficult question.
The authors of Good Work pose an interesting question that we should
consider: if you had a choice, what sort of problem would you work on for

group.org (last visited Oct. 31, 2002) (noting that the effort was facilitated by Consensus
Council, Inc. and coordinated by Search For Common Ground, an organization that facilitates
conflict resolution processes internationally and domestically and that promotes establishment
of the U.S. Policy Consensus Commission, which would promote consensus-building processes
at various levels of government action).
229. A standard canon of organizational sociology requires that new professions use ethics
codes to establish legitimacy and to prevent competition with other professions. See MAGALI
SARFATIl LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS S4 (1977);
Andrew Abbott, Jurisdictional Conflicts: A New Approach to the Development of the Legal
ProfeSSions, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 187,188 (1986).
230. For a good definition of what an ethical "dilemma" is in dispute resolution, see
ROBERT BARUCH BUSH, THE DILEMMAS OF MEDIATION PRACTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICAL
DILEMMAS AND POUCY IMPUCATIONS (1992).
231. See COLE ET AL, supra note 155; see also VA. RULES OF PROF'LCONDUCT R. 2.10
(2000) (listing the third-party neutral rule).
232. See TENN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.4 (effective Mar. 1,2003).
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the next ten years of your professionallife?233 I have answered that question
for myself by suggesting that lawyers can pursue "the central mission of the
legal profession [in] the pursuit of justice, through the resolution of conflict
or the orderly and civilized righting of wrongs"234 by striving for peace as "a
prerequisite for justice, ,,23S and developing the skills and the ethical
commitments to attempt to make social, legal, political, and economic
problems more amenable to democratic, creative, and life-enhancing
resolutions that include more active participation by more of the people
affected by decisions made and actions taken.
I believe that lawyers may play an important, but not exclusive, role in
organizing and facilitating such democratic deliberation and negotiation to
produce both better processes and better outcomes in the world. Clearly, we
need new solutions to significant problems such as economic health and just
distribution, health care, family responsibilities, corporate accountability,
market productivity, resource allocation and environmental health, respectful
treatment of a diverse citizenship, unemployment, and, not least of all,
domestic and world peace. New skills are necessary for professions, such as
law, to negotiate effectively with multiple parties, to lead and facilitate
productive deliberations rather than simply making arguments to win, to
imagine new and unused resolutions, and to work with contingent solutions
to indeterminate problems as our "solution-oriented" science attempts to keep
up with our changing knowledge base.
Skillful management of the conflicts that human beings produce for
themselves is indeed, as Stuart Hampshire says, one of the most important of
human skills. It is also one of the most difficult skills to learn and teach
because it is not a "single" skill, but a set of competencies, judgments,
empathies, and other sensibilities that it may take a long time to teach and
learn. I believe that these skills and sensibilities are central to our continued
existence. I continue to believe, as both a teacher and an ethicist, that such
skills may be learned and must be practiced responsibly and morally within
that tension of what we can do for others and what we do for survival and selfpreservation or representation of others. By clarifying our purposes and
aspirational values, by applying these aspirational principles to actual
dilemmas of practice, and by committing ourselves to develop standards for
responsible exercise of our various skills, we may not only make "new
professions" (when our old and conventional ones fail to adapt adequately to
change within honored traditions) that link several professional domains, but
we can make the practice of our work both more individually fulfilling and
social welfare enhancing.

233. GARDNERET AL., supra note 227, at ix.
234. Id. at 10.
235. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Practicing "In the Interests ofJustice" in the TwentyFirst Century: Pursuing Peace as Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 1761, 1765 (2002).
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I hope that I have at least suggested some of the important issues and
values that we should consider while we recognize the importance of this
"new" work of the lawyer as dispute resolver, facilitator, and consensus
builder. I have no doubt that lawyers who work as consensus builders,
mediators, facilitators, and legal problem solvers will find that work fulfilling,
as I have. Our legal ethical standards (as lawyers) do not provide useful
beacons of light as we navigate in these new, but much needed, roles. We
may only be at the discussion stage in our deliberations about new ethics for
deliberators, so I hope I have at least spotted some issues and offered some
useful ideas as we begin to try to develop some consensus about how lawyers
might build more consensus in our conflict-ridden society.
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APPENDIX

Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct (effective Mar. 1,2003)
Rule 2.4: Lawyer as Dispute Resolution Neutral
(a) A lawyer serves as a dispute resolution neutral when the lawyer impartially
assists two or more persons who are not clients of the lawyer to reach a
resolution of disputes that have arisen between them. Service as a dispute
resolution neutral may include service as a mediator; an arbitrator whose
decision does not bind the parties; a case evaluator; a judge or juror in a minitrial or summary jury trial as described in Supreme Court Rule 31; or in such
other capacity as will enable the lawyer to impartially assist the parties resolve
their dispute.
(b) A lawyer may serve as a dispute resolution neutral in a matter if:

(1) the lawyer is competent to handle the matter;
(2) the lawyer can handle the matter without undue delay;
,
(3) the lawyer reasonably believes he or she can be impartial as between the
parties;
(4) none of the parties to the dispute is being represented by the lawyer in
other matters;
(5) the lawyer's service as a dispute resolution neutral in the matter will not
be adversely affected by the representation of clients with interests directly
adverse to any of the parties to the dispute, by the lawyer's responsibilities to
a client or a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests;
(6) the lawyer consults with each of the parties to the dispute, or their
attorneys, about the lawyer's qualifications and experience as a dispute
resolution neutral, the rules and procedures that will be followed in the
proceeding, and the lawyer's responsibilities as a dispute resolution neutral;
provided, however, that any party to the dispute who is represented by a
lawyer may waive his or her right to all or part of the consultation required by
this paragraph;
(7) the lawyer consults with each of the parties, or their lawyers, about any
interests of the lawyer, the lawyer's clients, the clients of other lawyers with
whom the lawyer is associated in a firm, or third persons that may materially
affect the lawyer's impartiality in the matter;
(8) unless the service is pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 31, each of the
parties, or their attorneys, consents in writing to the lawyer's service as a
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dispute resolution neutral in the matter; and
(9) when the service is pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 31, the lawyer is
qualified to serve in accordance with the requirements of that Rule.
(c) While serving as a dispute resolution neutral, a lawyer shall:
(1) act reasonably to assure that the parties understand the rules and
procedures that will be followed in the proceeding and the lawyer's
responsibilities as a dispute resolution neutral;
(2) act impartially, competently, and expeditiously to assist the parties in
resolving the matters in dispute;
(3) promote mutual respect among the parties for the dispute resolution
process;
(4) as between the parties to the dispute and third persons, treat all
information related to the dispute as if it were information protected by Rules
1.6 and 1.8(b);
(5) as between the parties to the dispute, treat all information obtained in an
individual caucus with a party or a party's lawyer as if it were information
related to the representation of a client protected by Rules 1.6 and 1. 8(b);
(6) render no legal advice to any party to the dispute, but, if the lawyer
believes that an unrepresented party does not understand how a proposed
agreement might affect his or her legal rights or obligations, the lawyer shall
advise that party to seek the advice of independent counsel;
(7) accept nothing of value, other than fully disclosed reasonable
compensation for services rendered as the dispute resolution neutral, from a
party, a party's lawyer, or any other person involved or interested in the
dispute resolution process;
(8) not seek to coerce or unfairly influence a party to accept a proposal for
resolution of a matter in dispute and shall not make any substantive decisions
on behalf of a party; and
(9) when the service is pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 31, comply with all
other duties of a dispute resolution neutral as set forth in that Rule.
(d) A lawyer shall withdraw from service as a dispute resolution neutral or,
if appointed by a court, shall seek the court's permission to withdraw from
service as a dispute resolution neutral, if:
(1) any of the parties so request;

HeinOnline -- 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 115 2002-2003

116

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:63

(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that further dispute resolution services will
not lead to an agreement resolving the matter in dispute or that any of the
parties are unwilling or unable to cooperate with the lawyer's dispute
resolution initiatives; or
(3) any of the conditions stated in paragraph (b) are no longer satisfied.
( e) Upon termination of a lawyer's service as a dispute resolution neutral, the
lawyer:
(1) may, with the consent of all the parties to the dispute and in compliance
with the requirements of Rules 1.2(c) and 2.2, draft a settlement agreement
that results from the dispute resolution process, but shall not otherwise
represent any or all of the parties in connection with the matter, and
(2) shall afford each party to the dispute the protections afforded a client by
Rules 1.6, 1.8(b), and 1.9.
Comments
[1] Mediation, arbitration, and other forms of alternative dispute resolution
have been in use for many years, but increasing demands in recent years for
more prompt and efficient means of resolving disputes of all kinds have led
to an increase in the demand for the services of dispute resolution neutrals
skilled in the analysis of disputes and in conflict resolution. Lawyers are
often particularly well-suited to perform this role and should be encouraged
to do so.
[2] Although service as a dispute resolution neutral is considered a law-related
service governed generally by these Rules, see RPC 5.7, the unique nature of
a lawyer's role when serving as a dispute resolution neutral demands separate,
more specific, treatment in this Rule for the guidance ofthe profession and the
public.
[3] This Rule provides that a lawyer may serve as a dispute resolution neutral,
whether as a mediator, a non-binding arbitrator, a case evaluator, or a judge
or juror in a mini-trial or summary jury trial. The scope ofa lawyer's possible
service as a neutral is intended to be generally the same as that adopted in'
Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 31 governing court-annexed alternative
dispute resolution. However, although Rule 31 covers only court-annexed
alternative dispute resolution, this Rule covers services as a dispute resolution
neutral whether rendered in connection with court-annexed dispute resolution
proceedings or in another, perhaps wholly private, context not covered by
Rule 31.
[4] This Rule does not cover the rendering by a lawyer of services related to
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alternative dispute resolution that are not neutral in nature, but are more
judicial in nature, such as service as an arbitrator in a binding arbitration.
Although Rule 5.7 may address a lawyer's obligations in such a context, this
Rule does not purport to address them.
[5] Although a lawyer who serves as a dispute resolution neutral is subject to
the Rules of Professional Conduct, see RPC 5.7, many of the Rules do not
directly apply to such service because the participants in a dispute resolution
proceeding are not the lawyer's clients. Other Rules do apply, however, and
this Rule further provides specific applications of certain rules that must apply
differently in this context (including, for example, the application of rules
governing conflicts of interest).
[6] Although the requirements of this Rule are generally intended to be
consistent with those imposed on dispute resolution neutrals under Rule 31,
there are duties additional to those set out in Rule 31 that are imposed on
lawyers who serve in this role. See also Supreme Court Rule 31, Appendix:
Standards of Professional Conduct for Rule 31 Mediators. Even though
nonlawyers certified by the Supreme Court under Rule 31 as dispute
resolution neutrals may not be subject to these Rules and the parties to the
dispute are not deemed to be the clients of the lawyer serving as their dispute
resolution neutral, the parties are properly entitled to assume that lawyers
serving in this capacity are largely subject to the same broad standards of
conduct as are applicable to lawyers when they are providing legal services
to clients.
[7] The Supreme Court has set forth in Rule 31 rules and standards of
professional conduct applicable to all Rule 31 neutrals, including lawyers and
nonlawyers. Thus, paragraph (b) contemplates that a lawyer may serve as a
Rule 31 neutral if the lawyer complies with these requirements. Paragraph
(b)(9) further requires that a lawyer serving as a dispute resolution neutral
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 31 must comply fully with the requirements
of that Rule as well.
[8] Paragraph (b) specifies the circumstances in which a lawyer may serve
parties to a dispute as a dispute resolution neutral. With respect to the parties
to the dispute, Rule 1.7 is inapplicable because there is no client-lawyer
relationship between the neutral and the parties to the dispute. Rule 1.7
remains applicable, however, to protect a client, as distinct from parties the
lawyer is serving as a neutral, if the lawyer's service as a neutral will
materially limit the lawyer's representation of that client. Similarly, if the
lawyer's service as a neutral would be materially adverse to one of the
lawyer's former clients, and the matters are substantially related, the lawyer
must afford the former client the protection of Rule 1.9.
[9] Conflicts of interest for lawyers serving as dispute resolution neutrals are
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specifically addressed because the parties to a dispute resolution proceeding
are not the clients of the dispute resolution neutral. The lawyer serving as
neutral, however, must be impartial, must fully disclose any pertinent
relationships to the parties to the proceeding, and must obtain their consent to
the lawyer's service based on these disclosures. Paragraph (b)(4) does not
provide for mandatory vicarious disqualification based on a lawyer's current
or prospective service as a dispute resolution neutral. If, however, a lawyer
asked to serve as a neutral has a partner who currently represents one of the
parties to the dispute in other matters, the lawyer obviously would be required
to disclose this fact to the parties under (b)(7) and obtain consent to service
as a neutral. Of course, this lawyer must also possess a reasonable belief that
impartiality was possible despite this and other such pertinent relationships.
Ifa lawyer may not make the disclosures required by paragraph (b)(7) because
of his confidentiality obligations to a client, then the lawyer may not serve as
a dispute neutral.
[10] Paragraph (c) further provides various standards of conduct particular to
service by a lawyer as a dispute resolution neutral. Again, these rules of
conduct are intended to be consistent with Rule 31 and to address the
particular situation of a neutral who occupies a significantly different
relationship to participants in a dispute resolution proceeding than a lawyer
does with clients. Paragraphs (c)(4) and (c)(5) treat the confidentiality of all
information related to the dispute (including that obtained in individual
caucuses with the parties) by analogy to the rules concerning the
confidentiality of client information. Thus, for example, any question
concerning the potential disclosure of fraud by a participant in a dispute
resolution proceeding would be addressed under Rules 1.6, 3.3, or 4.1 as
though the participant were, in fact, a client of the lawyer. Other portions of
paragraph (c), such as the ban on undisclosed compensation by one of the
participants in paragraph (c )(7), the prohibition on coercion or decision
making on behalf of parties in paragraph (c )(8), and the ban on giving legal
advice to the participants in paragraph (c)(6), impose restrictions needed to
insure and reinforce the necessary impartiality of the lawyer serving as a
dispute resolution neutral.
[11] Paragraph (d) requires that a lawyer serving as a dispute resolution
neutral withdraw or seek an appointing court's permission to withdraw in
certain specified circumstances, such as a request by a party to do so or the
lawyer's reasonable belief that the lawyer's service will not be fruitful.
[12] Paragraph (e) establishes a lawyer's duties toward participants in a
dispute resolution proceeding upon the termination of the lawyer's service as
a neutral for any reason, whether because a settlement is achieved or because
a party requests the lawyer's withdrawal. Given the impartial role of a dispute
resolution neutral, it is inappropriate for a lawyer who had served as a dispute
resolution neutral to later represent any of the parties to the dispute in
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connection with the subject matter of that dispute resolution proceeding. This
disqualification, however, does not extend to other lawyers associated in a law
firm with the dispute resolution neutral. If, however, the parties have
successfully resolved their dispute, paragraph (e)(I) permits the lawyerneutral to draft the agreement settling their dispute, but this must be done in
conformity with Rules 1.2(c) and 2.2.
[13] Further, paragraph (e)(2) provides that, even though the participants to
a concluded dispute resolution proceeding were not the clients of the lawyer
who served as a dispute resolution neutral in that proceeding, these
participants are nevertheless entitled to the protections relating to
confidentiality and conflicts of interest afforded by Rules 1.6, 1.8(b), and 1.9
as if they were former clients.
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